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MILITARY GUILTY PLEA INQUIRY:
SOME CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
I. Introduction
The enormous growth in the number of criminal cases
prosecuted in criminal jurisdictions throughout the United
1
States and the limited judicial resources available has led
to increased reliance on the guilty plea and plea bargain-
2
ing. It has been estimated that more than ninety percent of
all criminal convictions in the United States result from
3
guilty pleas. Clearly, the criminal justice system has come
to rely on the guilty plea to handle an overwhelming case-
load; plea bargaining has emerged as the catalyst for dealing
4
with it. The United States Supreme Court has recognized the
modern role of plea bargaining as an "essential component of
5
the administration of justice."
The military justice system processes criminal cases
from a segment of United States society which has some unique
requirements, but is in many respects a cross-section of the
American populace. For fiscal year 1984, 19,175 United States
6
servicemen were tried by court-martial from a total active
7
duty military force of 2,095,000 persons. With such a case-
load, the military justice system faces stress similar to
8
that experienced by state and federal criminal systems. The
use of plea bargaining to formulate pretrial agreements has
9
been employed in the military justice system since 1953. The
prevalence of plea bargaining to resolve cases in the mili-
10
tary justice system today is understandable.

Less understandable are the procedural differences
regarding trial court acceptance of guilty pleas which have
evolved between the United States federal court system and
the United States military justice system. The United States
Constitution as it applies to pleas of guilty is certainly
equally applicable to cases tried in both systems. However,
the Congress and military appellate courts have extended
protections to the military accused who pleads guilty which
transcend constitutional requirements.
This paper will examine the constitutional requirements
for trial court acceptance of guilty pleas. These constitu-
tional requirements will then be compared to the statutory
and judicial law which has evolved separately in federal and
military courts, with emphasis on their distinguishing
features. Throughout the analysis, the constitutional role
and effect of plea bargaining and its ramifications for both
systems will be considered. Analysis will be presented
concerning whether special needs of the military accused who
pleads guilty require broader safeguards than those which are
constitutionally mandated to protect individual rights and/or
the integrity of the military justice system.
If existing extra-constitutional procedural safeguards
for the military accused are unnecessary, legislative revi-
sion and military case law reconsideration are in order to
eliminate a guilty plea procedure wasteful of judicial
resources. On the other hand, if such safeguards are
necessary, they should either be preserved or more efficient
alternatives should be implemented to accomplish the desired

effect. This paper will explore both possibilities and pro-
pose statutory and case law revision which will foster growth
of a streamlined approach to guilty plea procedure in the
military courts while simultaneously preserving the integrity
of a criminal system designed to provide world-wide justice
during times of United States military exigency.
II. Guilty Pleas and the Constitution
A. Background of Guilty Pleas
While guilty pleas are rooted in the early common law,
11
they were initially regarded with much disfavor. English
common law courts were very reluctant to accept such an in-
court confession and often bullied the defendant into with-
12
drawing the guilty plea or refused to accept his plea.
Several explanations for favoring jury trials over guilty
pleas during the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth cen-
turies are possible. First, suspects were tried shortly after
the occurrence of the offense and trials were short in dura-
13
tion, several often being conducted in a single day.
Several differences between these early contested trials and
modern American criminal trials explain their brevity: (1)
witness recollection was fresh; (2) pretrial investigations
were not "burdened" by individual rights and often produced
out-of- court confessions; (3) virtually all relevant evi-
dence was admissible at trial; (4) no lawyer appeared for
the prosecution or the defendant, who spoke for himself;
14
(5) jury instructions by the court were perfunctory. Thus,

neither guilty pleas nor plea bargaining were needed to
expedite early common law criminal trials.
This disfavor for guilty pleas had an intangible aspect
which transcended the mere lack of necessity for expedience.
At times, early English courts and writers approached the
mere possibility of driving the innocent to conviction with a
15
large degree of paranoia. There seemed to be a presumption
that a criminal defendant who pleaded guilty was almost
incompetent, which may have been due in part to the fact that
stakes were high during that time. Death was the prescribed
16
punishment for over 220 felonies in England in 1819. The
absence of a defense counsel at trial rendered the judge the
sole protector against undue suffering by an accused with no
17
legal knowledge and was likely the single most important
factor in the disfavor with which guilty pleas were viewed.
Receipt of appropriate legal advice by a criminal defendant
continues to be an important factor in the development of
many aspects of the law concerning guilty pleas.
The common law caution regarding guilty pleas continued
during American law development. However, in 1892, the United
States Supreme Court first upheld a conviction of a criminal
18
defendant who pled guilty to a charge of murder. The Court
concluded that the plea was voluntarily rrade and the defen-
dant was deprived of no right or privilege within the protec-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Consti-
19
tution. Guilty pleas still were not prevalent in the Ameri-
20
can criminal law system until the 1920's. A major factor in
this attitudinal change was the emergence of the plea bar-

21
gaining phenomena in the United States.
B. Background and Constitutionality of Plea Bargaining
During the early development of the common law, the
courts had no occasion to address plea bargains. Guilty pleas
were regarded as a "confession;" thus, the common law rule
which invalidated out-of-court confessions obtained in ex-
change for a promise of leniency would also apply to a guilty
plea which was an in-court "confession" in exchange for a
22
promise of leniency. That factor, combined with the predis-
position against guilty pleas in general, probably explains
the early absence of plea bargaining.
There are some indications that plea bargaining took
23
place in America as early as the Civil War. The tendency
among appellate courts during that time was to uphold guilty
pleas only in cases where explicit bargaining between the
24
prosecution and the defense had not taken place. In the
Whiskey Cases, the United States Supreme Court first
25
addressed the issue of plea bargaining. There, the
prosecutor struck a bargain with defendants whereby they each
agreed to plead guilty to one count of a federal indictment
in exchange for their agreement to testify against other
26
officials. The Court nullified the portion of the agreement
concerning guilty pleas, but approved the prosecutorial prac-
tice of bargaining for testimony in exchange for non-prosecu-
27
tion. One commentator noted:
As the Whiskey Cases reveal, the common
law did permit a sacrifice of the public
interest in punishing a single offender

in order to gain his assistance in
convicting other criminals, and it
devised an open and regularized form of
bargaining to accomplish this result.
Nevertheless, the court apparently did
not countenance bargaining for pleas at
all. 28
With the arrival of the twentieth century, the gap
between appellate court disapproval of plea bargaining and
29
actual practice widened. By the 1920's, plea bargaining was
30
a de facto feature of American criminal justice systems. As
greater caseloads increase the strain on the justice system
in modern times, the importance of plea bargaining has
intensified. However, debate concerning its efficacy and
constitutional propriety has never subsided.
Many commentators have attacked the use of plea bar-
gaining to resolve the dilemma facing the overburdened crimi-
nal justice system. As stated by one author:
The criminal justice system has
become a complex bureaucracy preoccupied
with its "capacity to apprehend, try,
convict and dispose of a high proportion
of criminal offenders whose offenses
become known" and guided by the need for
speed and finality. Presently, a set of
informal decisions by police and prosecu-
tors separate the apparently innocent
from the presumably guilty. Because of
administrative pressure, little subse-
quent attention can be given to these
initial determinations, and they are most
often confirmed quickly by a guilty plea
or a dismissal of charges. The scrutiny
of the criminal trial process is lost.
Indeed, the primary purpose of plea bar-
gaining is to assure that the jury trial
system established by the Constitution is
seldom utilized. 31
Plea bargaining is often criticized as undermining the
accused's constitutional privilege against self-incriraina-

tion under the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights of confronta-
tion, compulsory process and jury trial. In support of this
position, authors have cited policy reasons against plea
bargaining: (1) trials make the legal process visible, serv-
32
ing as a lesson in fairness to the accused and the public;
(2) exercise of the accused's constitutional rights checks
33
the exercise of government power; (3) sentencing decisions
which should reflect criminal justice goals of rehabilita-
tion, incapacitation, deterrence and retribution are made on
3A
the basis of administrative efficiency; (A) the Constitu-
tion prescribes the protection accorded by fundamental
guarantees of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, but makes no
provision for their suspension in the interests of admini-
35
strative economy; (5) plea bargaining encourages many
accused to forego constitutional rights in cases where "weak"
36
evidence would not have sustained a conviction at trial.
These factors often loom large in the background of court
considerations of various aspects of the guilty plea.
Proponents of plea bargaining generally take a pragmat-
ic approach: (1) it is an economically necessary phenomena
resulting from lack of resources necessary to provide univer-
sal jury trials; (2) no adequate remedies exist to enforce
abolition of plea bargaining and attempts to do so force it
37
back into the closet. In 1970, the United States Supreine
Court finally began to acknowledge with approval the practice
of plea bargaining. In Brady v. United States
,
the Court
analogized plea bargaining to tactical situations wherein a
defense lawyer might advise his client to plead guilty in

order to secure the lenience of a particular judge vice a
38
jury trial. In that case, the Court specifically declined
to hold "that a guilty plea is compelled and invalid under
the Fifth Amendment whenever motivated by the defendant's
desire to accept the certainty or probability of a lesser
penalty rather than face a wider range of possibilities
extending from acquittal to conviction and a higher penalty
39
authorized by law for the crime charged." In Santobello
v . New York , the United States Supreme Court was emphatic in
its endorsement of plea bargaining:
The disposition of criminal charges
by agreement between the prosecutor and
the accused, sometimes loosely called
"plea bargaining," is an essential compo-
nent of the administration of justice.
Properly administered, it is to be en-
couraged. If every criminal charge were
subjected to a full-scale trial, the
States and the Federal Government would
need to multiply by many times the number
of judges and court facilities. Disposi-
tion of charges after plea discussions is
not only an essential part of the process
but a highly desirable part for many
reasons. It leads to prompt and largely
final disposition of most criminal cases;
it avoids much of the corrosive impact of
enforced idleness during pretrial con-
finement for those who are denied release
pending trial; it protects the public
from those accused persons who are prone
to continue criminal conduct even while
on pretrial release; and, by shortening
the t.i.me between charge and disposition,
it enhances whatever may be the rehabili-
tative prospects of the guilty when they
are ultimately imprisoned . 40
Several times since Santobello was decided, the Supreme
Court has reaffirmed the role of the plea bargain as an
41
important part of American criminal justice. Despite criti-

cisra from many legal scholars since 1970, the United States
Supreme Court remains firm in refusing to recognize plea




A plea bargain alone is without constitu-
tional significance; in itself it is a
mere executory agreement which, until
embodied in the judgment of a court, does
not deprive an accused of liberty or any
other constitutionally protected inter-
est. It is the ensuing guilty plea that
implicates the Constitution . 42
Thus, while plea bargaining now plays a siginificant role in
American criminal justice systems, the constitutional focus
has been on the resulting guilty plea itself.
C. Constitutional Requirements of Voluntariness and
Understanding
The United States Supreme Court gave early recognition
to the significance of a guilty plea. In United States v.
Kercheval
,
the Court emphatically observed: "A plea of guilty
differs in purpose and effect from a mere admission or an
extra-judicial confession; it is itself a conviction. Like a
verdict of a jury it is conclusive. More is not required; the
43
court has nothing to do but give judgment and sentence."
Once an accused enters a guilty plea, the fundamental rights
to contest non jurisdictional defects in the trial, to a trial
by jury, to confront adverse witnesses, to contest the
admissibility of adverse evidence, to reduce self -incrimina-
44
tion and to present evidence in self-defense are waived.




It has long been the position of the United States
Supreme Court than a confession must be free and voluntary
and not produced by inducements engendering either hope or
45
fear. In 1927, the Court held that this standard also
applied to guilty pleas and embellished the standard by
requiring that "a plea of guilty shall not be accepted unless
made voluntarily after proper advice with full understanding
46
of the consequences." This "voluntary and understanding"
standard has been the constitutional measure of guilty pleas
since that time, although some courts use the terms "intelli-
gent" and "knowing" interchangeably with the term "under-
47
standing". The standard became more reviewable in 1969 when
the Supreme Court, in Boykin v. Alabama
,
held that the trial
record must disclose that the accused voluntarily annd under-
48
standingly entered a guilty plea. However, the Court has
not been precise in defining what voluntariness means. As
noted by one author:
"When it states that a waiver is
involuntary, the Court sometimes means
that the state has engaged in conduct
that impaired the defendant's capacity
for self determination either by breaking
his will or by preventing him from making
a free and unconstrained choice. At other
times, however, the Court means chat the
state has engaged in conduct that is
offensive or that falls below judge-
created standards of decency. 49
Because the range of governmental conduct extends from
threats of physical violence which would clearly invalidate a
50
guilty plea to more subtle forms of compulsion, deciding
10

which behavior renders pleas involuntary becomes more diffi-
51
cult. Various decisions of the United States Supreme Court
have given some constitutional definition to the requirement
that a plea be voluntarily made. A threat by FBI agents to
publish untrue statements about the defendant to incite the
public to call for his execution was held to coerce an invol-
52
untary guilty plea by the Court in Waley v. Johnson . In
Townsend v. Burke
,
the Supreme Court held that, where an
accused was held incommunicado for forty hours by government
53
agents, his guilty plea thereafter was not coerced A
coerced extra-judicial confession induced a guilty plea which




In United States v. Jackson
,
the Supreme Court struck
down a section of the Federal Kidnapping Act which provided
that the death penalty could only be awarded by jury; the
statute coerced defendants to plead guilty with sentencing by
the judge to insure that capital punishment would not
55
result. However, only two years later, in Parker v. North
Carolina
, the Court found a defendant's plea to be voluntary
under a statutory arrangement providing a lower maximum pen-
alty for defendants pleading guilty than those contesting
56
charges for the same offense. The Supreme Court weakly
distinguished Jackson on the basis that it involved an uncon-
stitutional death penalty statute while the issue in Parker
57
was strictly the voluntariness of the guilty plea. The
Court in Parker also refused to invalidate the guilty plea on
grounds that an involuntary extra-judicial confession coerced
11

the guilty plea. The trial record was rife with indications
that the coercive effects of the illegal confession had
59
dissipated by the time the guilty plea was entered.
In McMann v. Richardson
,
the Supreme Court held that a
defendant represented by counsel could not plead guilty at
trial and later petition, without more , for habeas corpus ,
claiming he pled guilty because of a prior coerced confes-
60
sion. In both Parker and McMann
,
the Supreme Court reaf-




cases were decided on May 4, 1970. In Brady , the Court
reaffirmed that a guilty plea induced by coercion, threat,
intimidation, deception or trick is involuntary, but that
62
plea bargaining does not, of its own accord, flaw a plea.
In Parker , McMann and Brady (hereinafter referred to as the
Brady trilogy), the Court based its voluntariness discussion
largely on the presence of competent defense counsel in court
63
with the accused when the guilty plea was entered.
Since the decisions in the Brady trilogy were handed
down, the United States Supreme Court has considered no
guilty plea cases which turned directly on the voluntariness
requirement. However, the Court has indicated that it has not
waivered in its view of the effects of voluntariness in the
guilty plea context. In 19/6, the Court decided Hu tt o v
.
Ross , a case in which the defendant made a plea bargain which
64
was not conditioned on his extra-judicial confession. After
signing a confession, the defendant retained a second attor-




not guilty. The Court held that his confession was volun-
66
tary and could be used against him at trial. Although H u 1 1 o
V
.
Ross did not involve a guilty plea, it demonstrates the
Court's continuing propensity to view voluntariness as a
matter isolated from other factors in the case.
In Corbitt v. New Jersey
,
the Supreme Court approved a
state statutory scheme which allowed a plea of non vul
t
to
murder, thus authorizing a sentence of thirty years imprison-
ment vice a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment for the
67
defendant who unsuccessfully contested his case. The Court
indicated that a guilty plea under such a statute would not
68
be coercive. In 1983, the Supreme Court upheld the guilty
plea of a defendant made after the prosecutor had clearly
69
withdrawn from the plea bargain, in Mabry v. Johnson
,
again viewing the guilty plea in a vacuum when deciding that
70
it was voluntarily made. Many authors have assailed the
Court's position that an accused may voluntarily plead guilty
to an offense despite tempting plea bargains and statutory
schemes offering "safer" alternatives to a contested case.
One author states:
That a defendant rationally chose between
available alternatives does not establish
voluntariness. The Court has long recog-
nized that a choice is not voluntary
merely because the actor was free from
the more ^»bvious and oppressive forms of
physical coercion. I'/henever a defendant
waives a constitutional right to avoid an
unpleasant result, a court must determine
whether the waiver was induced by pro-
raises or threats which deprive it of the
character of a voluntary act. 71
The protestations of such authors notwithstanding, it appears
13

that the United States Supreme Court will remain intractable
in its views of the constitutional voluntariness requirement
for guilty pleas.
2. Understanding Requirement
While often considered coexistent with the voluntari-
ness requirement, the constitutional understanding require-
ment for guilty pleas has been a more fertile source of
72
litigation since Boykin v. Alabama was decided in 1969.
Because the determination of a defendant's understanding of
the legal consequences of a guilty plea is subjective by
nature, the United States Supreme Court has struggled to
provide objective standards to measure his knowledge. That
effort has generated many sub-issues to be considered in the
constitutional review of guilty pleas. The Court has concen-
trated on three primary issues relating to whether a guilty
plea is unders tandingly entered: (1) the waiver of an
accused's rights and defenses; (2) the competence of the
accused to plead guilty; (3) information disclosed to the
accused during the guilty plea colloquy.
The Brady trilogy previously discussed indicated that a
guilty plea constitutes a waiver of the right to attack all
73
non- jurisdictional defects in a criminal case. Prior to
that trilogy jf decisions, many courts held that a defendant
must "knowingly" waive each of the defenses possible in
entering a guilty plea. As stated by the United States Court
of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Lucia ;
A plea of guilty is an abbreviated way of
going down the list of possible defenses
14

and pri vileges . . . and waiving each one.
The plea represents the rel inquishnen t of
a bundle of defenses, and has no magical
implications with regard to finality
beyond that. The whole does not exceed
the sum of its parts. If one of the
component waivers was ineffective because
of the inadequate knowledge upon which it
was made, the defect is not cured by
virtue of the fact that the waiver was
made implicitly, as part of the guilty
plea . 74
Had Lucia prevailed as the common law rule for guilty
plea waiver of rights, the constitutional understanding re-
quirement may have taken a different shape. However, the
United States Supreme Court has continued its extension of
the waiver language of the Brady trilogy. In 1973, the
Supreme Court decided Tollett v. Henderson
,
reasoning:
[A] guilty plea represents a break in the
chain of events which preceeded it in the
criminal process. \'/hen a criminal defen-
dant has solemly admitted in open court
that he is in fact guilty of the offenses
with which he is charged, he may not
hereafter raise independent claims re-
lating to the deprivation of constitu-
tional rights that occurred prior to the
entry of the guilty plea. 75
The Supreme Court has reaffirmed the Brad y trilogy waiver
doctrine in several other cases. In Blackledge v. Perry
,
the
Court approved the waiver rationale while sustaining the
defendant's right to attack the trial court's jurisdiction
76
despite a guilty plea. Similarly, the Court upheld the
defendant's rights to challenge a conviction on grounds of
double jeopardy, even though he pleaded guilty at trial in
77
Henna v. New York . In Haring v. Prosise , the Supreme Court
reaffirmed Toilet t ' s bar to a guilty-pleading defendant's
attack on governmental deprivation of rights occurring prior
15

to the conviction, but nevertheless allowed him to seek
78
damages under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983.
Several common threads run through the Brady trilogy
and its guilty plea waiver progeny. First, the cases reempha-
size the Supreme Court's tendency to consider the constitu-
tional knowing requirement of guilty pleas in isolation. In
recognizing the finality of guilty plea trials through the
Brady waiver doctrine, the Court has accorded some semblance
of stability to a criminal system which has come to explicit-
ly rely on plea bargaining to handle its huge case load. In
other words, the Court has implicitly decided that an accused
should not reap the benefits of a plea bargain and then later
be allowed to assert possible defenses to his crime through
the avenue of habeas corpus . Second, the Court has often
relied on the accused's factual guilt to support its waiver
arguments. Third, the Court placed overwhelming emphasis on
the assistance of a competent counsel in the defendant's
entry of a guilty plea. As stated by the Court in Toilet , the
defendant "may only attack the voluntary and intelligent
character of guilty pleas by showing that the advice received
from counsel was not within the range of competence demanded
79
by attorneys in criminal cases." These tendencies pervade
the Supreme Court's consideration of guilty pleas and are
critical to an analysis of the constitutional understanding
requirement
.
Because of the Brady trilogy's waiver doctrine, some
legal scholars have argued that the uncertainties of a poten-
16

tial defense present the accused with a dilemma when a bene-
ficial plea bargain is available. Thus, the defendant may opt
to plead guilty to an offense without gaining a true under-
standing of the consequences thereof and waive all non-
jurisdictional defects that have occurred, impacting the
80
constitutionality of the plea. Several authors have sug-
gested that an accused in such a position should be allowed
to enter a conditional plea, whereby denial of a dispositive
defense motion could be appealed despite entry of a guilty
81
plea. The Supreme Court has never considered the condition-
al guilty pleas available in the federal courts, but approved
state procedures which permitted a non- jurisdictional defect
to be raised on appeal after a guilty plea in Lefkowitz v.
82
Newsome and Haring v. Prosise . Absent conditional pleas,
the Brady trilogy's waiver doctrine remains viable. The Court
has shown no signs that it will recognize the dilemma it
creates regarding the understanding requirement as being of
constitutional significance.
In considering the understanding requirement for guilty
pleas, the United States Supreme Court has also addressed the
defendant's competence. In Brady v. United States , the Court
indicated that the accused possessed sufficient understanding
to plead guilty because, inter alia , "there was nothing to
indicate that he was incompetent or otherwise not in control
83
of his mental faculties..." In other cases, the Supreme
Court has indicated that convictions of legally incompetent
84
persons violate due process. Although the Court has not
spoken directly on the issue, most United States Courts of
17

Appeal have applied the same common law standard to both
competency to stand trial and to competency to plead
85
guilty. The standard for federal courts was adopted in
Dusky V. United States ; the Supreme Court indicated the "test
must be whether the defendant has sufficient present ability
to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of
rational understanding — and whether he has a rational as
well as factual understanding of the proceedings against
86
him." Again, the Court focused on the defendant's relation-
ship with his attorney, this time to define competency.
Once the threshhold issue of the accused's competency
to plead guilty was crossed, the effectiveness of the legal
representation afforded to the accused was in issue in each
87
of the Brady trilogy cases. In those cases the Court abso-
lutely linked competency of counsel to the understanding
requirement for guilty pleas. In McMann , the Court stated;
"Whether a plea is unintelligent and therefore vulnerable...
depends as an initial matter, not on whether the court would
retrospectively consider counsel's advice to be right or
wrong, but on whether the advice was within the range of
88
competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases."
During the time since the Brady trilogy was decided,
the United States Supreme Court has been re.''uctant to strike
down guilty pleas on grounds they were not understandingly
made due to ineffective assistance of counsel. One author
attributes that fact to the reluctance of judges in general
to pass critical judgment on attorneys:
18

17hen the issue is described as the compe-
tence of counsel, a court is apparently
required to make an a_d hominem judgment
about a member of the bar. When a court
asks about the knowing quality of a
defendant's choice, it focuses directly
on his state of mind and can thereby
avoid, or at least mute, any intimation
of professional insult. In practice,
judges tend to close ranks when members
of the legal profession are threatened,
and partly for this reason, courts have
usually defined the right to effective
assistance of counsel in narrow terms.
Although some courts have articulated
more generous standards in the period
since the guilty-plea trilogy was de-
cided, most courts refuse relief on
grounds of ineffective assistance unless
the proceedings were "a farce, and a
mockery of justice. "89
Against this background of judicial hostility toward
ineffectiveness of counsel issues, the United States Supreme
Court has continually emphasized the importance of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel in its decisions. In Gideon v .
Wainwr ight
,
the Court stated: "The right of one charged with
crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental and essential
90
to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours." In
United States v. Ash , the Supreme Court indicated that "the
core purpose of the counsel guarantee was to assure 'assis-
tance' at trial, when the accused was confronted with both
the intricacies of the law and the advocacy of the public
91
prosecutor." The Court held that the Constitution guaran-
tees the defendant adequate legal assistance and a competent
92 93
attorney in Cuyler v. Sullivan and Engle v . Isaac .
The Supreme Court's rhetoric notwithstanding, two of
its recent decisions demonstrate a continued judicial reluc-
tance to find that a defense counsel is incompetent. In
19

Uni ted_States v. Cronic
,
the Court refused to apply an infe-
rence that a defense counsel, who was experienced only in
real estate matters, had never tried a criminal or jury case
and who was given only 25 days to prepare the defense, was
94
incompetent. The Court indicated that there was no showing
"that counsel failed to function in any meaningful sense as
95
the Government's adversary." In Strickland v. Washington
,
the Supreme Court mandated highly deferential judicial
scrutiny of counsel's performance:
Thus, a court deciding an actual
ineffectiveness claim must judge the
reasonableness of counsel's challenged
conduct on the facts of the particular
case, viewed as of the time of counsel's
conduct. A convicted defendant making a
claim of ineffective assistance must
identify the acts or omissions of counsel
that are alleged not to have been the
result of reasonable professional judg-
ment. The court robust then determine
whether, in light of all the circum-
stances, the identified acts or omissions
were outside the wide range of profes-
sionally competent assistance. In making
that determination, the court should keep
in mind that counsel's function, as ela-
borated in prevailing professional norms,
is to make the adversarial testing pro-
cess work in the particular case. At the
same time, the court should recognize
that counsel is strongly presum.ed to have
rendered adequate assistance and made all
significant decisions in the exercise
of reasonable professional judgment. 96
The Strickland majority held that to overcome the presumption
of competency of defense counsel, "The defendant must show
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for coun-
sel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different. A reasonable probability is a
20





Given the heavy burden placed on an accused to show
ineffectiveness of counsel, it is difficult for him to pre-
vail on that issue in a contested case, where the defense
counsel's performance is a matter of record. However, it has
been suggested that an accused attacking the understanding
requirement of a guilty plea by demonstrating counsel incom-
petence has an even more difficult task for several reasons:
(1) the defense counsel's plea bargaining sessions with the
prosecutor are not public; (2) the defense counsel's confer-
ences with the accused are not a matter of record; (3) the
standards of counsel performance in an unstructured bargain-
98
ing situation are not .clear. Thus, although the United
States Supreme Court holds open the possibility of a guilty-
pleading defendant attacking the plea on grounds it was not
understandingly made due to defense counsel ineptitude, it
may be difficult to sustain such a position. This may result
from the underlying desire of the Court to preserve the
"orderly administration of justice" in American criminal
justice systems which rely heavily on the plea bargain by
99
making most guilty pleas unassailable.
Another critical aspect of the understanding require-
ment is the information which must constitutionally be con-
veyed to the accused during the guilty plea colloquy at
trial. Early on, the United States Supreme Court required
that an accused must receive notice of the charges against
100 101
him and be informed of their nature in order to enter
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an intelligent guilty plea. In general, the Supreme Court has
not required that the accused be advised as to the elements
of the offense(s) alleged against him. However, where the
accused waived the right to counsel, the Court indicated that
the trial judge must insure that she understood the nature of
the charges prior to accepting a guilty plea, in Von Mo Ike v.
102
Gilles . In McCarthy v. United States
,
the Court stated:
"because a guilty plea is an admission of all the elements of
a formal criminal charge, it cannot be truly voluntary unless
the defendant understands the law in relation to the
103
facts. Further, the Supreme Court requires a criminal
trial judge to not only ensure that an accused pleading
guilty has "full understanding of what the plea connotes" but
also to leave a "record adequate for any review that may be
104
later sought . "
Although the elements of the offense need not be ex-
plained on the record, the Supreme Court held that the
accused must be informed of the intent element of the charged
105
offense to enter a knowing plea in Henderson v . Morgan.
The Court implied that a record indicating that the defense
counsel had explained the nature of the offense to the
accused or that a presumption that such was accomplished
106
would have sufficed. However, the trial court in Hende-^son
made a factual finding that the intent element had not- been
explained to the accused, so the Court was constrained to
107
hold that his plea was not unders tandingly made. In
Marshall v. Lonberger
,
the Supreme Court held that a defen-
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dant knowingly pled guilty even though the record did not
specifically indicate that he was informed of the nature of
the charges, relying on the Henderson presumption that the
accused's lawyer had informed him of the nature of the
108
offenses to which he pled. Thus, the accused's attorney
again plays an important role in the Court's constitutional
determination of whether the accused was sufficiently
apprised of the nature of the offense(s) during the guilty
plea colloquy to knowingly plead guilty.
Another aspect of the constitutional understanding
requirement for guilty pleas is the accused's awareness of
the consequences of such a plea before it is entered. The
United States Supreme Court has not made any definitive
statements regarding the matter. In Kercheval v. United
States , the Court indicated that a plea of guilty should be
accepted only "after proper advice and with full understand-
109
ing of the consequences." Later, Supreme Court cases
indicated that, at least where the accused was not represent-
ed by counsel, he must be informed of the potential punish-
ment for the offense(s) to which a guilty plea was
110
entered. In Boykin v . Alabama , the Court indicated that
the trial judge bears the responsibility for conveying such
information to the accused: "V/hat is at stake for the accused
facing death or imprisonment demands the utmost solicitude of
which the courts are capable in canvasing the matter with the
accused to make sure he has a full understanding of what the
111
plea connotes and of its consequences."
The only case in which the United States Supreme Court
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has addressed the accused's understanding of the consequences
112
of pleading guilty was United States v. Timmreck . The
trial court had accepted the accused's guilty plea without
infor.-ning him of the mandatory five year special parole term
113
attached to the offense. The Court held that, in the
absence of a showing of prejudice to the accused, the over-
sight was neither jurisdictional nor constitutional and up-
114
held the guilty plea. The Supreme Court left open the
possibility that judicial failure to fully acquaint the ac-
cused with the sentencing consequences of a guilty plea may
render the plea constitutionally infirm if the accused is
prejudiced thereby.
United States Circuit Courts of Appeal have held that
an understanding guilty plea constitutionally requires an
attorney to inform his or her client of the maximum sentence
115
iraposeable. However, as discussed earlier, it is unlikely
that the Supreme Court would require more than an assertion
in the record of trial that such information was conveyed to
uphold a guilty plea. As indicated in Henderson v. Morgan ,
the Court would likely presume that a competent counsel had
116
completely informed the accused. The Court's recent
statement regarding an extrajudicial confession is also rele-
vant to the understanding requirement for gu.. Ity pleas:
"This Court has never embraced the theory that a defendant's
ignorance of the full consequences of his decisions vitiates
117
their voluntariness." Such a pronouncement is consistent




In Von Moltke v. Gillies
,
the United States Supreme
Court held that, prior to accepting a guilty plea from an
accused not represented by counsel, the trial judge must
118
review possible defenses to the charge(s). Generally,
consideration of whether an intelligent guilty plea requires
that the accused be informed of the possible defenses occurs
in cases involving defense counsel. In the Brady trilogy
cases, the Court found that potential defenses did not impact
the understanding guilty plea of an accused represented by
119
competent counsel. The Court essentially presumed that
the defenses were considered by the accused and counsel and
refused to require the court to address defenses during the
guilty plea colloquy. In Toilet v. Henderson , the Court
indicated that it is not necessary for the accused's attorney
to discuss all defenses with his client prior to entry of a
120 121




the Supreme Court allowed the defen-
dants to make habeas corpus assertions of defenses that were
not raised at trial. However, in those cases the Court did
not hold that the guilty pleas were not understandingly made,
but instead found that the habeas corpus claims attacked the
123
jurisdiction of the trial courts. The Court did not
suggest that either the trial court or the accused's counsel
was required to inform the accused of potential substantive
124
defenses prior to entry of a knowing guilty plea. Given
the tenor of the Supreme Court's decisions regarding the
constitutional understanding requirement, it is unlikely that
25

it will burden either trial courts or defense counsel with
the requirement of reviewing all potential defenses with the
accused prior to acceptance of a guilty plea.
D. Constitutionality of Equivocal Guilty Pleas
As discussed, a guilty plea must be voluntary and
understanding. Underlying these constitutional requirements
is the historical notion that a defendant may waive certain
125
constitutional rights only by judicially confessing guilt.




"Central to the plea and the foundation for
entering judgment against the defendant is the defendant's
admission in open court that he committed the acts charged in
126
the indictment." In 1970, the Supreme Court cast a new
light on the constitutional consideration of guilty pleas
127
when it decided North Carolina v. Alford .
Alford was charged with first-degree murder by iJorth
128
Carolina after the shotgun killing of an acquaintance.
Although Alford professed innocence, his attorney could find
no witnesses to support his claim and a plethora of circum-
129
stantial evidence supported the state's case. In the face
of such overwhelming evidence, Alford agreed to the prosecu-
tor's plea bargain offer and pled guilty to a charge of
130
second-degree murder. Pr .or to acceptance of the guilty
plea, a police officer and two other witnesses testified,
131
summarizing the state's evidence against the accused.
Alford also testified, proclaiming his innocence and indicat-
ing that he was willingly pleading guilty, but only because
26

he feared that the state's evidence would convict him and
132
subject hira to capital punishment. The trial court final-
ly accepted Alford's guilty plea and he was sentenced to
133
thirty years of imprisonment. He unsuccessfully peti-
tioned for habeas corpus on grounds that his plea was invalid
because it was coerced in the state court, the United States
District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina and
134
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
Finally, in 1967, after Alford again unsuccessfully sought
habeas corpus in the United States District Court, the United
States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit reversed, granting
135
the writ. That decision was vacated by the United States
Supreme Court in 1970, holding that Alford's guilty plea was
136
voluntarily and intelligently entered.
In rejecting Alford's claim, the Court specifically
reaffirmed the constitutional test for guilty pleas, stating:
"The standard was and remains whether the plea represents a
voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative
137
courses of action." The Court relied heavily on the
factual circumstances of the accused's case which pointed
138
overwhelmingly towards his guilt. Its decision found
support in two prior Supreme Court cases, Lynch v
.
139 140
Overholser and Hudson v . United States . In Lynch , the
Court indicated that the trial judge could have constitution-
ally accepted a guilty plea to an offense with a one-year
prison term possible even though the evidence raised a possi-
141
ble insanity defense. Hudson held that a federal court
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may impose sentence based on a plea of nolo contendere , in
which the defendant does not admit guilt. The Court
reasoned that nolo contendere cases recognize the constitu-
tionality of pleas in which the accused is unwilling to admit
guilt and that it was not significant that such pleas may be
designated as "guilty pleas", stating:
Thus, while most pleas of guilty consist
of both a waiver of trial and an express
admission of guilt, the latter element is
not a constitutional requisite to the
imposition of criminal penalty. An indi-
vidual accused of crime may voluntarily,
knowingly and understandingly consent to
the imposition of a criminal sentence
even if he is unwilling or unable to
admit his participation in acts constitu-
ting the crime. 143
The Supreme Court once again viev/ed the voluntary and
understanding requirements in isolation in determining that
Alford's guilty plea was not coerced. Rather than finding
the plea to be coerced by the circumstances, the Court essen-
tially determined that the circumstances were probative of
Alford's rationality in pleading guilty; Alford voluntarily
took a reasonable course after being carefully apprised of
the facts and alternatives in his case by a competent attor-
ney. Thus, Alford's protestations of innocence did not negate
the constitutionality of his guilty plea.
The decision in Alford was not unanimous. Justice
Brennan was joined by Justices Douglas and Marshall in a
short dissent which opined that Alford's decision to plead
guilty was so tainted by his fear of the death penalty that
144
it was involuntary. One author suggested that the deci-
sion had no precential basis because: (1) a guilty plea
28

could historically be accepted only when accompanied by an
express admission of guilt; (2) the Court and the Hudson
decision misread the common law regarding nolo contendere ;
( 3 ) Lynch v. Qverholser did not involve a guilty plea by a
145
defendant who denied factual guilt. However, it is diffi-
cult for critics of the Alf ord decision to argue that it is
in the accused's best interest to "protect" his constitution-
al rights by forcing him to trial on the merits in the face
of overwhelming evidence. Thus, much of the academic coramen-
146
tary supports Alf ord .
Since xlorth Carolina v. Alford was decided, the Supreme
Court has rendered no decisions turning directly on the
constitutionality of equivocal guilty pleas. However,
Alford ' s rationale continues to be reaffirmed by the Court.
In his concurring opinion in Henderson v. Morgan
,
Justice
Vvhite again asserted that a defendant's intelligent conclu-
sion that his best interests require a guilty plea in the
face of strong government evidence despite his claimed inno-
cence constitutes "what may be viewed as a third method of
147
establishing a defendant's factual guilt." Other Supreme
Court decisions have approved plea bargaining in scenarios
which tended to discourage the accused's assertion of his
148
trial rights. In both United States v. Cronic and Mabry
v Johnson
,
the Court has recently reaffirmed its holding in
149
Alford
. If any Supreme Court movement is discernable in
the years since Alford was decided, it is in the direction of
a more stolid recognition of the principles therein espoused.
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E. Constitutional Right to Plead Guilty
The holding in A 1 f o r
d
that a trial court may constitu-
tionally accept an equivocal guilty plea makes sense in a
nation with criminal systems which depend heavily on the plea
bargain to function efficiently. If a criminal defendant may
put aside protestations of innocence to take advantage of a
favorable plea bargain in the face of over v; helming government
evidence, the question is raised whether he has a constitu-
tional right to plead guilty in order to do so. Conversely,
can the prosecuting authority force an accused to his consti-
tutional right to trial, thus exposing him to the possibility
of a significantly greater punishment on conviction?
On several occasions, the United States Supreme Court
has specifically declined to recognize any right in the
accused to plead guilty. In both Lynch v. Qverholser and
Santobello v. New York
, the Supreme Court embraced the con-
cept that a trial court "may reject a guilty plea in the
150






Our holding does not mean that a trial
court must accept every constitutionally
valid guilty plea merely because a defen-
dant wishes so to plead. A criminal
defendant does not have an absolute right
under the Constitution to have his guilty
plea accepted by the court.... the States
may bar their courts from accepting guil-
ty pleas from defendants who assert their
innocence . 151
Legal authors have occasionally suggested that the
court's discretion in rejecting guilty pleas should be
152
limited. II ow ever, the suggestion has not been raised in
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the constitutional context. As suggested by the Supreme
Court in Alf ord
, recognition of a right to make a voluntary
and understanding plea of guilty will come at a state, vice
federal, level. If such a right were recognized, however,
judicial discretion in the acceptance of guilty pleas could
not be totally eliminated or the trial court could not estab-
lish that the pleas were voluntary and understanding, and
thus constitutional. There appears to be little chance that
the Supreme Court will recognize a constitutional right to
have a guilty plea accepted.
III. Guilty Pleas in the Federal Courts
A. Statutory and Regulatory Background
United States District Court procedure for taking
pleas is set forth in Rule 11, Federal Rules of Criminal
153
Procedure (hereinafter referred to as Rule 11). Rule 11
was promulgated by the United States Supreme Court pursuant
to the authority vested by the Congress in 18 U.S.C. Section
15A
3771. Prior to 1966, Rule 11 provided only abbreviated
guidance to federal trial courts regarding pleas. One author
described its subsequent transition:
Rule 11, dealing with pleas of guil-
ty, not guilty, and nolo contendere , was
formerly ("old rule") a fairly brief set
of general guidelines that remained to be
fleshed out by the courts. Largely as a
result of case law development, the rule
was amended in 1966 ("1966 rule") to
specify more fully the conduct required
by the trial judge in accepting a plea.
In substance, the 1966 rule added the
conditions that the judge personally
address the defendant, include the defen-
dant's understanding of the consequences
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of the plea as an element in determining
voluntariness, and be satisfied that a
factual basis for the plea existed. 155
The constitutional voluntary and understanding require-
ments and other constitutional requirements were incorporated
into Rule 11. For example, section (g) of the current version
of Rule li reflects the Supreme Court's decision in 3 o y k i
n
V . Alabama , requiring that a guilty plea trial record reflect
156
a voluntary and understanding plea. In McCarthy v.
United States , the Court recognized the purposes of Rule 11:
(1) to assist the trial court in determining the constitu-
tionality of the plea; (2) to produce a complete record of
157
the plea. To achieve those purposes, the Court in McCarthy
required United States District Courts to directly inquire of
the accused as to the voluntary and understanding nature of
his plea, and held that failure to comply with Rule 11 re-
158
quired a guilty plea to be set aside.
In 1975, Congress approved extensive amendments to Rule
11 further reflecting case law development and providing more
159
detailed guidance to courts regarding pleas. \7ith the
impetus of the Supreme Court's decision in Santobello v. i.'ew
York
, the amendments for the first time required that plea
160
bargaining be revealed in open court. The 19 75 version of
Rule 11 was further amended in 1979 in t\/o respects: (1) a
plea bargain requiring a prosecutor's sentencing recommenda-
tion does not give the defendant a right to withdraw the plea
even though the court does not accept it; and (2) a section
regarding the admissibility of pleas, nlea discussions, and
161
related statements in subsequent hearings was added.

The 1975 amendments to Rule 11 also brought substantial
changes concerning the advice to be given to a defendant
162
regarding nolo contendere and guilty pleas. Rule 11 now
requires that the defendant be personally addressed in open
163
court and informed of his rights. The defendant must also
be advised regarding: (1) the nature of and penalties
possible for the offense to which he pleads; (2) his rights
to counsel; (3) the trial rights he is relinquishing by the
plea; (4) the possibility that if he is questioned under oath
about the offense to which he has pled, his ansv/ers could
later be used against him in a prosecution for perjury or
164
false statement. The 1982 amendments to Rule 11 added a
requirement that the defendant be warned of the possibility
165
of special parole terms. In 1985, Rule 11 was further




Other substantive changes to Rule 11 in 1975 included
modifications requiring the trial court to make inquiry to
167
determine that there is a factual basis for the plea. In
1983, a section was added allowing conditional pleas which
preserve appellate reviev/ of specified pretrial motions des-
pite a plea of guilty or nolo contendere , with the approval
168
of the c.'ial court and the prosecution. As discussed
earlier in this paper, the Supreme Court has not recognized a
constitutional requirement for allowing such pleas, but per-
mitted the adoption of such procedure as a measure to pre-
169
serve prosecutorial and judicial resources. The 1983
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amendments also added a section which provided that the
harmless error standard for appellate review be applied to
170
t h e r u 1 e .
Rule 11, as modified over the years, establishes the
statutory standards for federal court acceptance of guilty
pleas. The rule is theoretically designed to function in two
ways: (1) it protects defendants by enhancing the fairness of
plea proceedings; (2) it accords a measure of finality by
171
regulating plea negotiations. V/hether or not Rule 11
actually functions as planned depends on the judicial inter-
pretations of its requirements.
B. Federal Court Guilty Plea Inquiries
Rule 11 provides procedural requirements for federal
courts to satisfy the constitutional mandate for guilty
pleas. As the Rule has developed in complexity, it has spawn-
ed significant federal case law. In addition to the constitu-
tional requirements for guilty pleas, federal courts have
also interpreted Rule 11 to provide extra-constitutional
protection to the accused. Accordingly, the guilty plea
colloquy in federal trial courts has grown in complexity and
is rife with requirements which could lead to reversal by
appellate courts, if not met.
1. Court Advice to the Accused During Federal Court
Guilty Plea Inquiry
The federal courts have generally held that Rule 11
requires the nature of the charges to be explained to the
accused in some detail to insure that a guilty plea is. volun-
172
tarily and understandingly made. Use of forms during the
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guilty plea colloquy has met with approval, but not as a
substitute for the court's personal addressal of the
173
accused. The mere reading of an indictment to the accused
has been held to not satisfy the requirement that the court
personally explain the nature of the offense to the
174
accused. However, where the federal trial judge has the
charges read to the defendant and ascertains that they were
explained in detail previously by counsel, no equivalent of a
jury charge by the court is normally required prefatory to
175
acceptance of a guilty plea. Prior to the 1966 amendments
to Rule 11, the courts were generally able to satisfy the
knowing requirement with regard to nature of the charges by
176
simply asking the accused if he understood. In deciding
whether the accused has received adequate explanation of the
nature of the charge(s), the federal courts have been prone
to consider his or her intelligence and mental capacity in
177
conjunction with the advice provided by the court.
Prior to the 1975 amendments to Rule 11, the federal
courts were not required to explain penalties to the guilty
178
pleading defendant. Since that time, courts have read the
Rule 11 requirement of informing the accused of the mandatory
minimum penalty imposed by law somewhat restr ic t i vely . That
requirement has not been held to require the court to calcu-
late the earliest possible release date including credit for
179
good behavior and parole and so inform the defendant. The
trial court need not inform the accused of the probability of




maxiauni sentences irnposeable. The federal courts have been
unanimous in not requiring the trial judge to apprise the
accused of the concurrent or consecutive running of sentences
181
prior to acceptance of a guilty plea.
The courts have split concerning literal compliance
with the Rule 11 requirement to inform the accused of the
mandatory maximum sentence imposeable. Courts have given
approval to: (1) the trial judge informing the accused of the
182
raaxiraura aggregate sentence, the accused being informed of
the maximum penalty during arraignment vice the plea hear-
183
ing; (3) not informing the accused of the maximum penalty
at all when circumstances indicated that he knew of the
184
punishment possible.
On the other hand, several Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals cases have been reversed for want of literal corapli-
185
ance with this aspect of Rule 11. For example, the United
States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, overturned a guilty
plea case in which the trial court incorrectly advised the
accused of a greater punishment than was actually
186
possible .
A majority of the federal court appellate decisions
hold that the trial judge need not inform the accused of all
187
parole possibilities during the guilty plea colloquy. The
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit has held that
the requirement that the accused be informed of any special
parole term under Rule 11(c)(1) does not require that the
accused be advised of ordinary parole matters during the
188
guilty plea inquiry. A small minority of federal courts
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have held that the trial court must inform the accused of
regular parole consequences of his guilty plea prior to its
189
acceptance. The federal appellate courts have also not
required that the accused be informed by the trial judge that
parole revocation may be a consequence of the plea during the
190
guilty plea hearing.
The federal appellate courts have been nearly unanimous
in requiring literal compliance with Rule 11(c)(1) which was
part of the 1982 amendments to insure the defendant's under-
standing of special parole terms during the guilty plea
191
inquiry. Prior to the 1982 Amendments, the majority of
192
federal cases already provided such a requirement, but
cases were divided on the depth of the explanation required
193
of the trial court. The United States Court of Appeals,
Ninth Circuit recently upheld the conviction of an accused
who pled guilty but was not informed of the special parole
term until after the guilty plea was entered when he indi-
194
cated understanding and raised no objection.
Other types of advice required to be provided to the
accused during the guilty plea inquiry have engendered little
case law. Two circuits of the United States court of appeals
have held that the trial judge need not advise the guilty
pleading accused of his right to be represented by an attor-
ney if he is represented by a lawyer at the guilty plea hear-
195
ing. The federal court decisions have varied somewhat
regarding the specificity with which an accused must be
informed of his rights at trial and waiver of those rights.
Despite the requirements of Rule 11, one circuit of the
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United States court of appeals upheld a case in which the
accused was not informed of his right against self -incriraina-
196
tion during the guilty plea colloquy. Trial courts are
required to specifically warn of waiver of rights to jury
197
trial, but most cases have not required that an exhaustive
list of constitutional rights waived by a guilty plea be
198
provided to the accused. The federal appellate courts
generally do not reverse when the trial court fails to warn
the accused that his answers under oath during the guilty




2. Insuring the Voluntary and Understanding Nature
of Guilty Pleas in the Federal Courts
As previously discussed, Rule 11 incorporated the con-
stitutional voluntary and understanding requirements for
acceptable guilty pleas. Federal appellate cases have deve-
loped procedural requirements to assist trial courts in their
efforts to ascertain the constitutionality of pleas. In addi-
tion to the specific advice which must be provided to the
accused during the guilty plea colloquy, Rule 11 requires
that the trial court go further to insure the const i tut ional-
200
ity of the plea. To do this the trial court accepting a
guilty plea must personally address the accused in a manner
201
which varies from case to case. Utilization of standard
guilty plea colloquies or truncated inquiries have often
202
caused reversal. The practice of addressing multiple de-
fendants during a guilty plea inquiry has been held to satis-




addressed. The federal appellate courts have split on
whether an officer of the court other than the judge may
204
conduct the guilty plea inquiry. The depth of the guilty
plea inquiry conducted by the trial judge varies with the
nature of the charge, the accused's background^ whether he




Because a court cannot gauge a defendant's subjective
understanding of his guilty plea, federal appellate courts
have looked to other objective circumstances in the record to
uphold pleas. In a recent case decided by the United States
Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, the court considered both
the trial judge's discussions with the accused and with his
attorney to uphold the guilty plea as being knowingly
206
made. On the other hand, misrepresentations by a defense
counsel which persuade the accused to reasonably plead guilty
under a mistaken impression may cause the plea to be over-
207
turned. Courts have also looked to forms used in conjunc-
tion with the guilty plea colloquy to test the defendant's
understanding of his plea. Recently, the United States Court
of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit, upheld a guilty plea even
208
though the form used was misleading. During the guilty
plea colloquy, federal trial judges have not been called upon
by appellate courts to question the accused in any particular
manner. The senses and perceptions of the court must be
creatively utilized to test whether a plea is knowingly made.
Thus, the circumstances of the guilty plea and the competency
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and mental status of the accused must be determined by dili-
209
gent inquiry from the trial judge. In the absence of
specific indications that an accused was incompetent or in-
toxicated at the time of his plea, appellate courts have
generally held that mere status as an alcoholic or drug
addict does not impact the entry of an understanding guilty
210
plea .
Similarly, a federal trial court must be alert to
conduct a reasonable inquiry in order to determine the volun-
211
tariness of a guilty plea. Federal appellate courts have
generally held that the trial judge must specifically inquire
whether the accused is pleading guilty because of prior
212
discussions with the prosecutor and whether the guilty
213
plea resulted from force or threats. However, a plea is
not involuntary because it was motivated by fear of greater
214
punishment or by hope of a more lenient sentence. The
federal courts have consistently held that guilty pleas moti-
vated by false promises of defense counsel or prosecutors
215
will render a plea involuntary. On the other hand, a
guilty plea motivated by hopes for drug treatment and the
misjudged strength of the government's case have been held
216
voluntary. In fact, guilty pleas motivated by reasonable
tactical trial decisions of the accused which were erroneous
217
in hindsight have been upheld. Extra-judicial confe- sions
of the accused have also generally not rendered his subse-
218
quent guilty plea involuntary. To insure that a guilty
plea is voluntarily entered, the trial judge must embark on a
meaningful dialogue with the accused which will reveal all
AO

relevant facts. However, the remarks of the judge during the
trial must themselves be chosen with care lest they be held
219
coercive of the guilty plea.
3. Federal Court Involvement with Plea Bargains
Since Supreme Court recognition of plea bargaining, the
federal district courts have moved to consider plea bargains
on the record. Rule 11 allows the federal trial judge to
220
accept or reject a plea bargain. Generally, the federal
appellate courts have held that a trial court has a duty to
insure that a plea bargain meets the requirements of reason-
221
ableness from the standpoint of public interest. The trial
court must also inquire into the circumstances surrounding a
plea bargain and their potential impact on the voluntary and
222
understanding nature of the attendant guilty plea. How-
ever, the trial court must be careful not to participate in
the actual plea bargaining discussions to avoid possible
223
attacks on the voluntary nature of the guilty plea. The
federal trial court judge's inquiry must be thorough enough
to reveal all promises made in connection with a plea agree-
224
ment. In this manner, the trial court can evaluate and
preserve for the record any governmental overreaching and
circumstances which affect the constitutionality of the
guilty plea .
Although Rule 11 does not specify when the federal
trial court should require notification of the existence of a
plea agreement, the inquiry usually takes place when the
225
guilty plea is offered. The trial judge must warn the
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accused that, if the plea bargain includes an agreement by
the prosecutor to recommend or not oppose a particular sen-
tence, that provision is not binding on the court and does
not entitle the defendant to withdraw the plea if the sen-
226
tence imposed does not comport with such provision. Feder-
al appellate courts have compelled literal compliance with
this warning requirement, automatically reversing cases in
227
which it was not given. Thus, interjection of plea bar-
gaining into the federal guilty plea colloquy has further
impeded acceptance of a voluntary and understanding guilty
plea .
4. Determining the Factual Basis for the Guilty Plea
in Federal Courts
Since the 1966 amendments to Rule 11, federal trial
courts cannot accept a guilty plea without the judge inquir-
ing into and being satisfied that there is a factual basis
228
for such plea. As discussed earlier in this paper, there
is no constitutional requirement that a factual basis for the
offense be established prior to acceptance of a guilty
229
plea. Rule 11 is a procedural requirement in addition to
constitutional protections. The protective nature of the
factual basis inquiry was described by the Advisory Committee
on the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: "Such inquiry
should, e.g., protect a defendant who is in the position of
pleading voluntarily with an understanding of the nature of
the charge but without realizing that his conduct does not
230
actually fall within the charge." When a federal trial
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court establishes that no factual basis for a guilty plea




There is also no constitutional requirement that an
accused admit factual guilt to enter a voluntary and under-
232
standing guilty plea. Rule 11 indicates no intent to
impose such an extra-constitutional requirement on federal
233
courts. A federal trial court judge must be subjectively
satisfied that a factual basis exists for a guilty plea at
23A
trial. This satisfaction may, but need not necessarily
come from the accused personally, as long as the factual
235
basis is developed on the record. Federal appellate courts
have been very liberal in allowing trial courts to rely on
236
virtually all facts available to establish factual basis,
but they may not rely on assumptions of fact which may
237
potentially be open to dispute.
Federal appellate courts have allowed reliance on
factual basis established during sessions of the court prior
to the guilty plea colloquy. Factual basis may be established
238
by a prior guilty plea inquiry, evidence entered while the
239
accused was still contesting the case, the defendant's
confession read into the court record at the preliminary
240 2A1
hearing of the trial, the pre-sentence report, material
from a grand jury proceeding introdiced by the prosecutor at
242
a guilty plea inquiry, and factual synopsis prepared by
243
the prosecution and verified by the defendant in court.
Some courts have merely looked to the indictment in the case
244
to establish the factual basis.
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Some federal appellate courts uphold guilty pleas when
no factual basis for the guilty plea is established, taking
the position that the factual basis requirement of Rule 11 is
not constitutionally required and that pleas should be
invalidated only if not voluntarily and understandingly
245
made. Other courts have held that failure to satisfy the
factual basis requirement is not an independent basis for
invalidating a guilty plea, but may be relevant in deter-
246
mining whether a plea is intelligently made. Thus, while
the factual basis requirement of Rule 11 is a potential
barrier to the acceptance of guilty pleas by federal district
courts, it has been narrowly read by appellate courts.
C. Federal Trial Court Discretion and the Guilty Plea
As discussed earlier, the criminal trial court clearly
cannot accept a guilty plea which does not withstand scrutiny
of due process standards for the waiver of constitutional
247
rights. However, Rule 11 has introduced uncertainty among
the appellate circuits regarding the discretion of a trial
court judge to reject a guilty plea. Rule 11 imparts both
implied and direct discretionary powers to the trial judge to
reject guilty pleas. Section (c) of Rule 11 implies that the
trial court may reject a guilty nlea if not satisfied with
the accused's understanding c a the mandatory advice conveyed
248
to him under the rule. Similarly, section (d) prohibits
the court from accepting a guilty plea if it determines that
249
the plea is involuntary. If the trial judge determines




disc ret ionarily reject it under section (f), Rule 11.
Federal courts have been specifically vested with the discre-
tion to reject or accept plea agreements under section (e) of
251
Rule 11. Federal appellate courts have differed in their
focus on the standards applicable and trial court considera-
tions in exercising discretion to reject a guilty plea.
Prior to the adoption of the plea agreement portion of
Rule 11 in 1975, most cases simply acknowledged the trial
252
court's discretion to reject an otherwise proper plea.
However, one line of cases arose in the District of Columbia
Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals which implied
253
limitations to such discretion. In McCoy v. United States
,
254 255
Griffin v. United States, and United States v. Hoskins
,
the District of Columbia Circuit took the position that a
guilty plea should be rejected only for "good reason." In
determining what constitutes "good reason", the court focused
on the prosecutor's need to encourage a guilty plea through
plea bargaining vice inconsistencies in the factual basis for
256
the plea. In 1974, the District of Columbia Circuit de-
cided United States v. Ammidown , holding that the trial court
must consider three factors in rejecting a plea bargain: (1)
fairness to the defendant; (2) prosecutorial discretion; (3)
257
judicial discretion to sentence. The court further re-
quired the trial court to provide a statement of reasons for
258
a discretionary rejection of a plea bargain.
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Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, indicated some willingness
to follow the District of Columbia Circuit's plea bargain
discretion cases. In those cases, the Fifth Circuit applied
the "good reason" standard, holding that the trial court's
discretion to reject guilty pleas and plea bargains was not
262
limitless. However, after the 1975 amendments to Rule 11,
the Fifth Circuit decided United States v. Bean
,
holding that
the trial judge retains discretion to reject plea bargains
under the rule and is not required to state reasons for doing
263
so. In Bean , the court indicated that the 1975 amendments
to Rule 11 may have eroded the Ammidown standard for discre-
264
tionary court acceptance of plea bargains.
Since Ammidown was decided in 1974, most federal courts
have either distinguished it or flatly rejected its hold-
265
ing. The federal courts have been nearly unanimous in
holding that a trial judge has discretion in rejecting
266
pleas. There has also been no discernable trend toward
requiring the trial judge to list the reasons for a discre-
267
tionary rejection of a plea bargain. Federal judicial
discretion to reject guilty pleas and plea bargains is nearly
unbridled. Ammidown did not result in any discernable move-
ment toward establishment of standards for rejection of
pleas
.
The Uniter" States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, has
left open the possible argument that a trial court does not
have absolute discretion to reject a plea bargain. In United
States V. Miller , the .''finth Circuit held that a categorical





the discretionary power vested by Rule 11. The court
relied on a separation of powers rationale to suppport its
argument that the judiciary should remain independent of
executive affairs, which include prosecutorial decisions.
Although reaffirming judicial discretion to reject plea bar-
gains, the court cautioned against judicial creation of broad
270
rules limiting prosecutorial independence. To insure main-
tenance of a proper balance between prosecutorial indepen-
dence and judicial discretion, the Ninth Circuit required
trial courts to set forth the prosecutor's reasons for fram-
ing the plea bargain and the court's justification for rejec-
271
tion thereof. There is thus far no indication that Miller
will engender a return toward the holding in Ammidown . How-
ever, the Ninth Circuit has used the separation of powers
analysis in three recent cases to strike down discretionary
272
trial court dismissal of charges. This analysis may become
the basis for future limits on the discretion of federal
trial courts to reject plea bargains in other circuit courts
of appeal .
D. Guilty Plea Trend in the Federal Courts
The trend in the federal courts is toward more active
involvement bv the trial court in the acceptance or rejection
of guilty pleas. Since 1966, Rule 11 has grown tremendously
in terras of both volume and impact on pleas. More specific
regulatory guidance over the acceptance of guilty pleas,
along with the case law it has spawned, has somewhat hand-
cuffed the trial courts to patterned procedures which must be
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meticulously followed to avoid appellate court reversal.
Those requirements are intended to ensure that: (1) the
guilty pleading accused receives specific constitutional
advice; (2) he receives complete information and advice con-
cerning his plea bargain; (3) a factual basis for the guilty
plea is established. Ostensibly, if the trial court follows
the pattern established for it by Rule 11 and federal case
law, it will be able to reach a reasonable conclusion as to
whether a guilty plea is voluntarily and understandingly
made, as required by the United States Constitution.
Despite the trend toward more guidance for the trial
court regarding acceptance of guilty pleas, a rule of reason
has prevailed in the federal courts. Recognizing that Rule 11
is not a constitutional mandate, appellate courts have fre-
quently upheld guilty pleas in the face of technical viola-
tions of the rule. Further, the enormous discretion vested in
federal trial courts regarding acceptance of plea bargains
has fostered the notion that the trial judiciary functions as
a watchdog of sorts, insuring that both the interests of the
public and the accused are well served. Such discretion has
to some degree freed federal trial courts from being second-
guessed by the appellate courts. However, broad discretion
can cuL two ways, rendering certain trial court decisions
virtually unreviewable and affording the accused little





IV, Guilty Pleas in the Military Courts
A. Statutory and Regulatory Background
The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) was origin-
ally enacted by the United States Congress in 1950 pursuant
to Article 1, section 3 of the United States Constitution to
provide a statutory framework for trial bv court-martial and
273
punishment of military offenses. The UCMJ authorized
military courts-martial to try military criminal cases,
defined military offenses and punishments, and set forth the
274
basic procedure for such trials. Article 45, UCMJ,
provides guidance for the taking of pleas from an accused
275
tried by court-martial. A court-martial may enter a find-
ing of guilty to a charge to v/hich an accused has pled guil-
ty, except; (1) v/hen the accused enters an irregular plead-
ing; (2) when the accused sets up a matter inconsistent v;ith
the plea; (3) when the accused improvidently pleads or lacks
understanding of the plea's m.eaning and effect; (4) when the
accused withdraws the plea of guilty prior to announcement of
sentence; (5) when the accused pleads guiltv to a charge for
276
which the death sentence may be adjudged. In these cases
or if the accused refuses to plead. Article 45, UCMJ requires
277
the court to enter a plea of not guilty on his behalf.
Article 36, UCMJ, authorizes the President of the
United States to prescribe rules governing pretrial, trial
"^ 7 2
and post-trial procedures in cases tried under the UCMJ.
By Executive Order 12473, Manual for Courts-martial, United
States, 1934 (.'ICM, 1984), the President prescribed such pro-
279
cedures. Rules for Courts-martial (RCM) 910, MCM , 1934 is
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the military equivalent of Rule 11 and is patterned after the
280
federal rule. Section (a) of RCM 910 provides for pleading
alternatives and conditional pleas similar to those found in
Rule 11; it also includes the Article 45, UCMJ prohibition of
guilty pleas when the death penalty is possible but it does
281
not provide for pleas of nolo contendere . Except for
references made to nolo contendere pleas, section (c) of RCM
910 requires the same substantive advice be given to the
282
accused as does the federal rule. Section (d) of both the
military rule and the federal rule are likewise strikingly
similar regarding the inquiry to be made by a court concern-
283
ing the voluntariness of a guilty plea. RCM 910, section
(e) has no federal equivalent and specifically requires the
military judge to establish a factual basis for the plea
284
through inquiry of the accused.
The plea bargaining procedure in the military is unlike
that in the federal courts so the provisions of RCM 910 and
Rule 11 regarding plea agreement inquiries are not corapar-
285
able. RCM 705, MCM , 1984, provides procedural guidance for
286
military pretrial agreements. All military courts-martial
are convened by a commanding officer in the accused's chain
of command designated as the convening authority (CA) by MCM,
1984, and all pretrial agreement negotiations must be under-
287
taken with that person. In pretrial agreements, the
accused may agree, inter alia
, to plead guilty to one or more
offenses in exchange for the CA ' s promise to exercise options
such as: (1) referral of charges to a certain type of forum
(e.g., Special Court-martial vice General Court-martial); (2)
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referral of a capital offense as noncapital; (3) withdrawal
of certain charges; (4) directing the prosecutor not to
present evidence on a charge; (5) taking specified action on
288
the sentence (e.g., suspend, mitigate or defer). A pre-
trial agreement that was not voluntarily made by the accused
or effectively deprives the accused of constitutional rights
289
is not enforceable. Military pretrial agreement offers
must originate with the accused and his counsel, must be
reduced to formal written agreements upon acceptance by the
CA, and the accused may withdraw from the agreement prior to
290
the announcement of sentence.
During the military plea inquiry, RCM 910 requires the
military judge to inquire about the existence of any pretrial
agreement prior to acceptance of a guilty plea and examine
291
the agreement for compliance with RCM 705. As part of the
guilty plea inquiry, the military judge must then question
the accused, the defense counsel, and the government counsel
to ensure that the accused understands the agreement and that
292
all parties are in agreement about its terras. If there is
a lack of understanding or disagreement as to terms, the
military judge may either allow the accused to withdraw from
the pretrial agreement, or, with the consent of the CA , con-
293
form its terras to the accused's understpnding . Unlike Rule
11, RCM 910 includes no provision for the military judge to
294
flatly reject a pretrial agreement. RCM 910 and Rule 11
are similar in requiring that the record of trial reflect the
295
inquiry made during the guilty plea proceedings.
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Article 45, UCMJ has been amended somewhat from its
296
original form in 1950. Subsection (b) was changed in 1968
to allow a finding of guilty by the military judge upon his
297
acceptance of the plea. This amendment was intended by
Congress to delete the former practice of assembling the
members of a court-martial to perform a ritualistic vote on
the findings to conform with common law practice and that of
298
the federal district courts.
Congress had good reasons to be cautious when it first
enacted the UCMJ. The 1950 version of the UCMJ required that
qualified members of the bar of a federal court or the high-
est court of a state be appointed as defense counsel only for
299
accused tried by General Court-martial (GCM). Trials by
Special Court-martial (SPCM) can award a jurisdictional maxi-
mum punishment consisting of a bad-conduct discharge, six
months confinement, reduction to the lowest enlisted paygrade
and forfeiture of two-thirds pay for six months and have
historically comprised an overwhelming majority of the mili-
300
tary caseload. Thus, when Congress passed the original
UCMJ in 1950, it was cognizant of the prospect that large
numbers of military persons would face trial with serious
possible consequences without representation by qualified
counsel. The Senate report which accompanied passage of the
1950 UCMJ reflected that concern and protective philosophy:
It is also contemplated that the
regulations will provide that the law
officer or the court shall explain the
meaning of any special defenses or
objections which may appear to be
available to the accused, in any case in




and shall advise him of his right to make
them, both as to the offense charged and
lesser included offenses, before pleading
to the general issue. 301
In enacting the 1950 UCMJ , Congress also made recommen-
dations for Manual for Courts-martial provisions which fur-
ther reflected its concern regarding guilty pleas without
counsel: (1) if an accused refused a defense counsel, his
guilty plea should be refused; (2) in pleading guilty, the
accused must admit to the acts charged; (3) the guilty plea
procedure should be set forth in the record of trial verba-
tim; (4) the accused pleading guilty should be advised by the
302
court as to any applicable statute of limitations. By
Executive Order 10214, the President prescribed the MCM,
1951, which not only included the recommended items but also
303
went much further. After the 1968 amendments to the UCMJ,
304
the MCM was again also amended in 1969. One amendment
required that qualified counsel be appointed for accused
305
tried by SPCM as well as GCM. However, the special protec-
tions afforded by paragraph 70 of MCM, 1951 were continued in
306
1969 and remain in substance in MCM, 1984. Thus, Article
45, UCMJ as it stands today still reflects congressional
concern about the military accused's lack of qualified repre-
sentation at most courts-martial. That Congress banned guilty
pleas in death penalty cases, required refusal of guilty
pleas if any matter inconsistent with guilt came to light at
trial, and wielded its influence to insure that MCM provi-
sions required the military courts to act as de facto defense
307
counsel in accepting such pleas.
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B. Military Court Guilty Plea Inquiries
1. Court Advice to the Accused During Guilty Plea
Inquiry in Military Courts
As the procedural regulatory requirements for accept-
ance of guilty pleas in military courts have grown, case law
has developed to interpret them. Some of the requirements of
ROM 910 are an embodiment of military case law. For instance,
the requirements that a military guilty plea inquiry must be
308
personally conducted by the military judge and elicit a
309
personal response from the accused result from United
States Court of Military Appeals (COMA) decisions. Other
cases have gone beyond statutory and regulatory requirements
for guilty pleas .
In United States v. Care , COMA decided the seminal
military case involving conduct of the guilty plea collo-
310
quy. In that case, the court specifically required that
certain advice be given to the accused prior to acceptance of
his guilty plea(s), most of which is now included in RCM
311
910. In addition to describing the nature of the guilty
plea inquiry to be conducted in all trials by court-martial,
the court specifically required that the accused be advised
(1) of the maximum punishment iraposeable; (2) that by his
plea of guilty, he gives up the right against self-incrimina
tion, the right to a trial on the merits by a court-martial,
and the right to confront and cross-examine any witnesses





The Rule 910 and Care requirement that an accused be
informed by the court as to the maximum possible penalty
provided by law has generated a number of appellate deci-
313
sions. In United States v. Zemartis
,
COMA ruled that such
advice must include the effect of recidividist escalated
314
punishment clauses possible under the UCMJ. Whether misad-
vice regarding maximum punishment is cause for reversal of a
guilty plea has largely depended on whether the raisadvice
caused a "substantial misunderstanding" on the part of the
accused. In United States v. White
,
COMA struck down a guilty
plea entered after the accused was mistakenly informed that a
315
bad-conduct discharge was possible for the offense. COMA
upheld a guilty plea when the accused was advised that he was
subject to a forefeiture of pay, but was not informed that he
could also be fined, because there was no substantial differ-
316
ence between the two. In cases where large discrepancies
exist between the actual amount of confinement possible for a
guilty pleading accused and the amount that the court inform-
ed the accused was possible, COMA has invariably overturned
317
the plea. However, in two recent cases, COMA has upheld
the guilty plea by looking to the terms of the pretrial
agreement to impute knowledge of maximum punishment to the
accused when the military judge failed to specifically inform
318
the accused of the maximum punishment. Thus, although COMA
has narrowly interpreted the requirement that the accused be
informed of the maximum punishment possible prior to accept-




The elements of each offense chargeable under the UCMJ
are set forth in the MCM, 1984, and COIIA has generally held
that their mere recitation will establish compliance with the
319
advice requirements of Care and RCM 910. Failure to list
the elements of an offense prior to acceptance of the accus-
ed's guilty plea has generally caused military cases to be
320
overturned. COMA has held that, in a case involving a
conspiracy charge, the military judge must inform the accused
of both the conspiracy elements and those for the underlying
321
substantive offense during the guilty plea inquiry. In a
recent Navy-Marine Court of Military Review (CMR) decision,
the court indicated that a guilty plea may not be invalid
when the military judge fails to specifically advise the
accused of one element, if the accused reveals facts during
322
the inquiry that indicate knowledge of the element. Thus,
while at least one CMR has indicated willingness to liberally
interpret RCM 910, COMA has generally interpreted it
narrowly .
In other cases, military appellate courts have been
protective of the accused by affirmatively requiring trial
courts to provide advice prior to acceptance of a guilty
plea. COMA recently held that, unless the record of trial
otherwise demonstrated understanding on the pa; _ of an ac-
cused, the military judge must specifically advise him of his
right to assert the statute of limitations during the guilty
323
plea inquiry. While the military cases have not required
the trial judge to inform the accused of administrative
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consequences of his guilty plea (e.g., discharge processing),
324
COMA has encouraged such disclosure. Some efforts have
also been made to encourage military courts to inform the
325
accused of appellate rights waived by guilty pleas.
Further, military appellate decisions have held that the
trial court must inform the accused of his rights to counsel
and will make no presumption that the accused has received
326
such advice from any other source. The military appellate
courts have thus been quite inflexible in interpreting the
RCM 910(c) requirements for advice to the accused during the
guilty plea inquiry.
2. Insuring the Voluntary and Understanding Nature of
Guilty Pleas in the Military Courts
RCM 910, section (d) provides procedural guidance to
assist military courts in ensuring that the constitutional
327
voluntary and understanding requirements are met. The
military appellate courts have interpreted RCM 910 expansive-
ly. To satisfy itself that a military guilty plea is volun-
tary and understanding, the trial court is required to engage
the accused in discourse more incisive than questions merely
328
answered in the affirmative or negative by the accused.
Thus, the military judge must be innovative in his effort to
elicit relevant information concerning the offenses during a
guilty plea inquiry.
Military case law has placed some limitations on the
military judge's involvement in the guilty plea process. COMA
has held that a military judge's intervention in the plea




decision to plead guilty. Similarly, false assurances to
an accused that unlawful search and chain of custody issues
would survive his guilty plea on appeal was held to invali-
330
date the plea as involuntary. Further, a military judge's
admonition implying that, if a defendant proceeded with pre-
plea motions, the sentence limitations in his pretrial agree-
ment might be jeopardized was held to vitiate a guilty
331
plea. Finally, the Air Force CMR has gone so far as to
require courts to affirmatively place on the record govern-
ment efforts to condition acceptance of a plea bargain on
defense agreement to refrain from motions or presenting ex-
332
tenuating and mitigating matters during sentencing. Thus,
in accepting military guilty pleas, the military judge must
travel the path between too little and excessive inquiry.
In assessing the voluntary and understanding nature of
a guilty plea under RCM 910, military appellate courts have
considered representation by an apparently competent defense
counsel and the "probability that the accused and his counsel
weighed the evidence and determined that it was inadequate
333
for an effective legal defense..." In United States v
.
Hannan , COMA held that it was the duty of the defense coun-
sel, not the military judge, to inform the accused of the
potential impact of parole on the -entence imposed pursuant
334
to a guilty plea. In Hannan , the court intimated that a
guilty plea induced by the accused's attorney's misinforma-
tion as to the nature of the sentence possible is not under-
335
standingly made.
The importance of United States v. Care goes beyond the
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previously discussed requirement that certain advice be pro-
336
vided to the accused during the guilty plea colloquy. That
decision also required military trial courts to inquire into
specific areas to evaluate the voluntariness and understand-
337
ing of the accused's guilty plea. Care required the mili-
tary judge to specifically test the accused's understanding
of the following: (1) his right to plead not guilty and place
the burden of proving his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on
the prosecution; (2) that, by his guilty plea, he gives up
the rights against self-incrimination, to be tried on the
merits by a court-martial, and to confront and cross-examine
witness against him; (3) the elements of the offense(s); (4)
the maximum punishment to which he will be subjected by his
guilty plea; (5) discussions with his counsel concerning the
meaning and effect of his plea; (6) whether he has been
forced or coerced to plead guilty; (7) whether it is in his
own best interest to plead guilty; (8) whether the plea is a
product of his own will and desire to confess his guilt; (9)
his right to withdraw his plea prior to the announcement of
338
sentence. Thus, the military trial court must not only
provide specific information to the accused during a guilty
plea inquiry, but must also make delineated types of inquiry
to satisfy itself that t' e plea is voluntarily and under-
standingly made.
The military appellate courts have strictly interpreted
the requirments of United States v. Care in evaluating know-
ing pleas. Although the guilty plea admits all the elements
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of the offense charged, the accused must understand the law
in relation to the facts for his plea to be under standingly
339
made. When the facts elicited during a guilty plea inquiry
suggest a defense to the charge, COMA requires the military
judge to insure the accused's understanding of the law sur-
340
rounding that defense. Military trial courts are also
required to sift through the facts elicited during providency
in search of indications that the accused may have lacked
3A1
mental responsibility in committing an offense. Thus, the
military judge must tiptoe through the morass of requirements
imposed by Care , RCM 910 and other case law to determine
whether an accused's guilty plea is knowingly made.
The military appellate courts have not been as restric-
tive in examining whether a plea is voluntarily made as they
have with the understanding requirement. Absent the obvious
force and threat disqualifiers listed in RCM 910(d), the
courts have not gone far afield to hold a guilty plea invol-
342
untary. For example, COMA held that legal and other ex-
penses incurred by an accused and efforts by the military to
administratively discharge him, were not coercive of his
343
guilty plea in United States v. Bedania . Also, entry of a
guilty plea by an accused to avoid the possibility of a death
sentence was not suff'-ciently coercive to invalidate the plea
344
in United States v. Partin . In a recent COMA case, where
the CA wrongfully influenced the availability of witnesses to
testify on behalf of the accused, the court upheld the guilty
pleas because there was no evidence indicating that the
345
unlawful activity influenced the guilty pleas. It there-
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fore appears that a direct causal relationship between the
coercive activity alleged and the guilty plea must be estab-
lished by the defense in order to invalidate the plea as
involuntary .
3. Military Court Involvement with Pretrial
Agreements
In 1976, COMA held that guilty plea colloquies pursuant
to United States_v ._Care must also include a detailed inquiry
into any pretrial agreement involved in the case, in United
346
States V . Green . The Green decision required military
trial courts to: (1) specifically inquire whether a plea
bargain exists; (2) insure that the accused understands each
condition of the pretrial agreement; (3) insure that the
accused understands the sentence limitations imposed by the
agreement; (4) strike down conditions in the pretrial agree-
ment which are violative of the law, public policy or the
judge's notions of fundamental fairness; (5) secure from the
defense counsel and the prosecutor assurances that the writ-
ten agreement encompasses all of the understandings of the
parties and that the judge's interpretation of the meaning
347
and effect of the agreement comports with theirs. The
court cautioned that v;hen an accused was to be sentenced by
military jud;je alone, vice court members, inquiry concerning
the sentence limitations of a pretrial agreement should be
348
delayed until after the announcement of sentence. Failure
to conduct a pretrial agreement inquiry pursuant to the
mandate in Green was held to be a matter affecting the valid-
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ity of the plea and these requirements were codified in RCM
349
910(f). Since the effective date of Green , military appel-
late courts have held that the circumstances surrounding a
pretrial agreement are relevant on the issue of whether a
350
guilty plea is voluntarily and under standingly entered.
Shortly after Green was decided, COMA indicated that it would
require strict scrutiny of all pretrial agreement terms in
351
United States v. King . However, in United States v
.
Crawford , COMA upheld a guilty plea when the inquiry did not
address all provisions of the pretrial agreement as required
352
by Green , but it was clear from the record that the
accused understood those provisions.
Military appellate courts have consistently held that a
military judge should not be an arbiter in pretrial negotia-
353
tions during the guilty plea inquiry. However, the milita-
ry court must inquire into every aspect of pretrial agree-
354
ment and is responsible for their enforcement and supervi-
355
sion in a manner which is fair to the accused. While the
military judge may not intervene in pretrial negotiations, he
must nevertheless police pretrial agreements to ensure com-
356
pliance with statutory and case law and public policy. By
court order, the military judge is empowered to modify pre-
trial agreements by implying terms, which must comport with
357
the r. xpressed intentions of the parties.
The military courts have adamantly required the judge
to inquire into and disclose the existence of a pretrial
358
agreement or any understandings of the parties. However,
COMA upheld a guilty plea when the accused did not personally
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assure the military judge that no such agreements existed,
359
but his attorney did so in his presence in open court. In
general, the terms of the pretrial agreement must be suffi-
360
ciently definite to withstand appellate scrutiny. If the
accused enters into a pretrial agreement with a mistaken
impression of the effect of its terms, his guilty plea will
361
be invalidated. The military judge must consider the be-
liefs of the accused, not his attorney, as to the effect of
362
terras .
Military appellate courts have been unwilling to over-
turn cases involving lack of specific procedural compliance
with Green when other facts adduced during the guilty plea
inquiry indicated the accused made a knowing plea. In
United States v. Cruz , COMA upheld a guilty plea although the
military judge failed to obtain the assurances of both coun-
sel that their understanding of the meaning and effect of the
363
pretrial agreement was the same as his. Similarly, COMA
upheld a case involving the trial court's failure to obtain
assurances from counsel that the written instrument consti-
364
tuted the entire pretrial agreement. Thus, military appel-
late courts have used substance rather than form to test the
procedural adequacy of guilty plea inquiries made pursuant to
365
Green .
The public policy review requirement of United States
V
. Green has engendered most of the case law regarding guilty
pleas made pursuant to pretrial agreements. COMA has held
that pretrial agreements which give the appearance that the
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government has overreached or used a technicality to deprive
an accused of the benefit of his bargain are against public
366
policy. Military appellate courts have upheld a variety of
pretrial agreement provisions as being consistent with public
policy: (1) terminating the pretrial agreement if the guilty
plea is not entered prior to presentation of evidence on the
367
merits; (2) making the agreement dependent upon the
368
accused's waiver of his right to a pretrial investigation;
(3) limiting punishment imposed only if the court awards a
369
punitive discharge; (4) requiring the accused to be
370
sentenced by military judge alone vice court members; (5)
the accused waiving his right to require the testimony of a
371
certain witness; (6) the CA obligating himself to take
372
certain administrative action subsequent to the trial; (7)
if a freely conceived defense product, foregoing litigation
of motions contesting the legality of search and seizure and
373 374
a lineup; (8) waiving a motion for a change of venue.
Many pretrial agreement provisions have also been
struck down as against public policy by the military appel-
late courts: (1) waiving any issue of speedy trial or denial
375 376
of due process; (2) waiving certain appellate rights;
(3) a terra invalidating the agreement if the accused commit-
ted further violations of the UCMJ between the date of trial
377
and the date of the CA's action; (4) requiring the accused
to withdraw a motion alleging unlawful command influence by
378
the CA .
In United States v. Jones
,
COMA articulated the stan-
dard by which pretrial agreements should be evaluated to
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determine whether they are contrary to public policy: "Only
actions which may reasonably be construed as attempts to
379
orchestrate the trial proceeding itself will be rebuffed."
COMA further indicated that terms such as waiver of motions
by pretrial agreement would not violate public policy and
vitiate a guilty plea as long as the record establishes that
380
the agreement was a "freely conceived defense product."
Thus, while COMA has effectively relaxed the public policy
standard, it continues to burden the military trial courts
with the task of making further inquiry during the guilty
plea hearing to determine whether certain clauses were freely
conceived by the defense.
4. Determining the Factual Basis for the Guilty Plea in
the Military Courts
As discussed earlier, there is no constitutional re-
quirement to establish a factual basis for a guilty plea. In
enacting Article 45, UCMJ , Congress nevertheless saw the need
for a factual basis for each military guilty plea, and for
the accused to make a judicial confession to the offense(s)
381
charged. These concerns have been defined by military case
law and RCM 910.
During the military guilty plea colloquy, the factual
basis for the plea must be established through personal
382
inquiry of the accused by the military judge. In United
States V. Care , COflA required military trial courts to speci-
fically warn the guilty pleading accused of his right to




guilty. Care also required that the accused be informed
that he should plead guilty only if he believes he is guilty;
the record must include the accused's responses to the
384
judge's inquiry into understanding of his pleading rights.
Independent evidence may be produced, but is not required,
during the guilty plea inquiry to establish a factual basis
385
for the plea. If the requirements of Article 45, UCMJ,
Rule 910(e), or military case law regarding the establishment
of a factual basis during the guilty plea colloquy are not
met, the military judge has considerable power to vacate the
386
plea .
A plea of guilty at a court-martial must be in accord-
387
ance with the actual facts and responsive to the truth.
The guilty plea inquiry must elicit from the military accused
the facts and circumstances surrounding the offense(s)
charged in order to establish, not only that he believes
388
himself to be guilty, but that he is, in fact, guilty. The
information elicited from the accused during the guilty plea
colloquy must also be sufficiently accurate to support a
389
conviction. The military judge must either resolve dis-
crepancies between the facts related by the accused and the
390
offenses charged or must refuse the plea. All of the part-
ies to the trial, including the counsel for both sides, have
the obligation to insure that the truth is placed on the
391
record during the military guilty plea inquiry.
Military appellate courts have also held that the fac-
tual basis elicited during the guilty plea inquiry must
392
establish guilt as a matter of law. Thus, during the
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guilty plea inquiry where the accused admits only to facts
393
indicating his innocence or guilt of an offense other than
394
that to which he pled, his plea should be rejected. The
facts admitted by the accused must support every element of
395
the offense(s) to which he enters a guilty plea. Thus, the
military court is required to legally evaluate the facts
presented by the accused during the guilty plea colloquy to
396
determine whether each element is established.
During the guilty plea inquiry, if the military accused
makes statements inconsistent with his factual guilt, his
plea must be rejected, even if the inconsistency was not
397
tantamount to a denial of guilt. Not only is there no
factual basis for a guilty plea if facts inconsistent with
the accused's guilt are elicited, but also if the inquiry
reveals that the accused maintains beliefs which are incon-
398
sistent with his guilt. When the accused makes an incon-
sistent statement during the guilty plea inquiry, the milita-
ry judge must successfully resolve the inconsistency on the
399
record to uphold the plea. If a statement inconsistent
with the accused's guilt is made by either the accused or
witnesses during other stages of the trial, such as sentenc-
ing, the military judge must reopen the guilty plea inquiry
400
and resolve the inconsistency or reject the plea.
V/hen the accused's responses during the guilty plea
inquiry suggest a possible defense to the offense alleged,
the military judge is required to clearly and concisely




understood. Through inquiry of the accused, the military
judge is then required to extensively explore the facts and
A02
circumstances surrounding the possible defense. The mili-
tary judge must be alert to defenses which are not readily
403
apparent during the guilty plea colloquy. Further, in
exploring the facts surrounding a potential defense, incorr-
ect application of the law by the trial court will cause
404
rejection of the guilty plea or appeal. In addressing a
potential defense during the guilty plea inquiry, the mili-
tary judge must elicit substantial facts to properly evaluate
its merit and not simply secure a legal conclusion by the
405
accused. The defense may be raised by facts adduced during
406
the guilty plea colloquy, or at any time during the trial.
If, through inquiry of the accused, the military judge is
unable to resolve a potential defense to a charge to which a
plea of guilty has been entered, the plea must be
407
rejected .
During the guilty plea inquiry, the military accused is
not required to describe the circumstances surrounding the
offense from personal recollection. Instead, he may admit the
factual basis of his guilty plea based on his understanding
408
and belief of the evidence available to the government.
For example, in United States v. Olson
, the accused's guilty
plea was accepted after the military judge elicited facts
during inquiry which indicated that the accused was fully
aware of the evidence against him, understood it, discussed
409
it with counsel, and believed it.
In closing the guilty plea inquiry, the military judge
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should make a specific finding that the accused has made a
knowing, conscious waiver of his rights before accepting the
410
plea, as required by United States v. Care . This
requirement is still another example of the procedural
strait- jacket in which military courts have been placed by
statute and case law in the conduct of guilty plea inquiries.
While COMA has held that failure of the trial court to make
411
the express closing finding is not error, the iJavy CMR has
412
reversed a guilty plea for lack thereof.
C. Military Trial Court Discretion and the Guilty Plea
Clearly, during courts-martial the military judge has
broad discretion to reject guilty pleas. Rule 910 requires
rejection of pleas of guilty to offenses for which the death
penalty may be adjudged and in cases where the accused is not
413
represented by counsel. Because of the military judge's
obligation to provide advice to the accused, explore the
accused's understanding of that advice, and make in-depth
inquiry into the plea's voluntary and understanding nature,
the possibility that discretion will be exercised to reject a
414
guilty plea is multiplied. The military requirements that
the accused admit to a factually accurate plea and for de-
tailed inquiry into pretrial agreements have imparted p'^arly
absolute discretion to the military judge in the re^^ection of
415
guilty pleas. As seen in the previous section of this
paper, military appellate decisions have interpreted Article
45, UCMJ and RCM 910 in such a restrictive manner as to place
a military judge in peril of reversal if there is a failure
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to comply with procedure mandated by Care and Green and their
progeny. This fear of reversal gives a military judge great
incentive to reject a guilty plea at the slightest indication
that the accused will have difficulty meeting one of the
myriad of requirements for its acceptance.
COMA has not addressed the issue of discretion of the
military judge to reject guilty pleas. Only the Army CMR has
directed its attention to the matter. United States v
.
Scarborough , an early Army CMR decision, indicated that judi-
416
cial discretion to reject guilty pleas was absolute. In
United States v. Johnson
,
the Army CMR held that the military
judge has wide discretion in rejecting guilty pleas, but that
such decisions were reviewable and could not be made arbi-
417
t r a r i 1 y . Johnson was a case in which the accused was an
alleged drug dealer whose guilty plea the military judge
refused to accept because he failed to disclose his drug
418
sources. In United States v. Auman
,
the Army CMR again
espoused the arbitrariness standard of reviev/ of court dis-
419
cretion to reject guilty pleas. However, review of that
420
record revealed no abuse of discretion. Thus, Johnson is
the only military appellate case to hold that a military
judge abused discretion in rejecting a guilty plea and it
involved a blatant abandonment of the judicial role. Since
COMA has chosen to remain silent on the issue, it is apparent
that discretion of military judges in rejecting guilty pleas
will continue to be essentially unreviewable.
D. Guilty Plea Trend in the Military Courts
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Although the trend in the federal courts is to\v/ard more
activity by the trial court in the acceptance or rejection of
guilty pleas, the military has become, by comparison, hyper-
active. Despite the similarities between RCM 910 and Rule 11
discussed earlier, appellate court interpretations have re-
sulted in very dissimilar guilty plea inquiries in the mili-
421
tary and federal criminal systems. The procedurally strict
requirements for the acceptance of guilty pleas in the mili-
tary courts have probably resulted in a higher percentage of
appellate reversals for cases involving such pleas than in
422
any other American jurisdiction. General comparisons and
commentary regarding the military and federal justice systems
serve as a convenient illustration of the divergent paths
possible under a single Constitution.
Federal case law has been much less restrictive in its
interpretation of the advice requirements under Rule 11 than
have the military cases under RCM 910. Federal cases have
generally been upheld when the court substantially complied
with the advice requirements concerning right to counsel,
waiver of trial and punishment possible during the guilty
423
plea colloquy. Specific advice concerning the elements of
the offenses to which a guilty plea is entered is not re-
424
quired at all in federal courts. Military appellate deci-
sions have been rigid in requiring literal compliance with
425
the RCM 910 mandate that the accused admit every element.
Guilty plea inquiries in the two systems differ signi-
ficantly in the area of advice regarding maximum punishment.
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In part, this may be attributable to the fact that the UCMJ
embraces the concept of a single sentence for all offenses
alleged while the federal courts pass a sentence for each
individual offense. Thus, a punishment advice error in the
military may potentially impact the validity of the entire
sentence, while such an error in the federal system may only
affect a single charge.
Another significant difference in the two systems is
the military penchant for requiring the accused to demon-
strate an understanding of the advice received during the
guilty plea hearing. This requirement, coupled with required
advice on the elements of the offenses to which a guilty plea
is entered, places the military judge in the untenable posi-
tion of providing scrupulously detailed advice and soliciting
its demonstrable understanding to withstand scrutiny by
appellate courts.
The military and federal systems have also approached
the voluntariness and understanding requirements of RCM 910
and Rule 11 in widely divergent manners. Both court systems
have been reluctant to invalidate guilty pleas for want of
voluntariness unless a direct causal relationship between the
426
coercive activity and the plea can be demonstrated. How-
ever, what appellate courts consider to be an acceptable
demonstration of the understanding nature of the guilty plea
highlights the differences in the two systems. The federal
courts have been willing to look to other circumstances
considered during the guilty plea colloquy to uphold a plea,




the statements of the accused. Also, the federal courts
have required specific indications of factors such as accused
incompetence to invalidate a guilty plea; the military courts
have seemingly scrutinized trial records for indications that
428
such factors were overlooked by the trial court. The
expansive mandate of United States v. Care has required mili-
tary judges to simultaneously be meticulous in conducting
inquiry into specific areas to demonstrate the understanding
nature of a guilty plea, while being innovatively expansive
in the attempt to ferret out any slight possibility that the
accused may have been misled in entering his plea.
Acceptance of guilty pleas in both the military and
federal courts has been impacted by appellate interpretations
429
of the plea bargain requirements of RCM 910 and Rule 11.
However, the degree of impact differs due to the more
restrictive reading given to RCM 910 and because the plea
430
bargaining process differs in the two systems. The federal
plea bargain encompasses an agreement reached between the
defendant and the United States attorney while the military
pretrial agreement must originate with the accused and is
431
approved by the CA. The law of both jurisdictions is
intended to prevent unfairness in the plea bargaining pro-
432
cess. However, while the feaeral case law has focused on
overall public interest, the military law is overwhelmingly
slanted towards protecting the accused from government over-
433
reaching through the plea bargain. The federal judge has
the infrequently employed discretion to evaluate and reject a
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plea bargain to insure justice for all parties, but lacks the
enormous discretion and obligation imposed on the military
judge to dissect each pretrial agreement in search of defects
434
likely to invalidate the guilty plea. The requirements of
United States v. Green render virtually every pretrial agree-
ment subject to the real possibility that the guilty plea
will be rejected because, inter alia : (1) the accused is
unable to demonstrate sufficient legal understanding of its
many provisions; (2) the agreement does not encompass all of
the understandings of the parties; (3) a provision in the
agreement does not comport with the military judge's personal
435
notions of public policy or fairness. Accordingly, many
more opportunities exist in the military justice system for
reversal of a guilty plea due to a defective plea bargain
than in the federal criminal system. Thus, the military
accused is far less likely to be able to enjoy the benefits
of a plea bargain than is his federal counterpart.
Perhaps the most marked difference between the guilty
plea inquiries in the federal and military systems is found
in the requirement that a factual basis be established for
the plea. Although not constitutionally mandated, this
requirement evolved to support the integrity of guilty pleas.
436
as a valid means of establishing criminal guilt. The
federal courts are far 1 jss exacting in their requirement for
a factual basis in support of the guilty plea, allowing means
other than the personal admissions of the defendant on the
437
record to suffice. In the military, an accused entering a
guilty plea must personally admit facts on the record indi-
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eating his truthful belief that he is guilty of each element
438
of the offense(s) as a matter of law. Further, during both
the guilty plea colloquy and other portions of the trial, the
military judge must constantly be alert for intimations of
legal defenses and facts or beliefs inconsistent with factual
439
and legal guilt. Failure of a military judge to note or
dispose of such defects in a guilty plea renders the case
440
ripe for appellate reversal.
Although some appellate case law exists in both the
federal criminal system and the military justice system to
the contrary, the trial courts in both systems have virtually
unlimited discretion to reject guilty pleas and plea bar-
441
gains. The difference between the two systems lies primar-
ily in the fact that the military judge has infinitely more
incentive to exercise that discretion to reject guilty pleas
than does his federal counterpart. Perhaps the traditional
scrutiny of military guilty pleas evolved from the spirit of
Congressional paternalism in enacting Article 45, UCMJ to
avoid the appearance of impropriety in the military justice
442
system. Whether or not such concern is still viable 37
years after the enactment of the UCMJ, the protective nature
of the military guilty plea inquiry has continued to grow
increasingly restr:^ctive through the promulgation of regula-
tions and appellate court interpretation. Today, the military
emphasis on factual guilt and procedural scrutiny of guilty
pleas has, for all practical purposes, become the equivalent
a trial on the merits. The guilty plea process has spawned
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such a complex body of military law that it is ripe for
analysis, reevaluat ion , and reform.
V. Analysis of Military Guilty Plea Inquiries
A. Framework for Analysis of Military Guilty Plea Inquiries
Thus far, this paper has traced the development of the
guilty plea inquiry in the military against its constitution-
al background, making comparisons with the federal criminal
system. In so doing, the author has implied that the military
guilty plea inquiry transcends both its original purpose and
constitutional requirements. The military guilty plea inquiry
will be analyzed from the perspectives of: (1) impact of the
guilty plea inquiry on the reasons an accused pleads guilty
at a court-martial; (2) impact of the guilty plea inquiry on
the accused's rights at a court-martial; (3) impact of the
military guilty plea inquiry on the integrity of the military
justice system.
1. Reasons an Accused Pleads Guilty at a Court-
martial
Once charges against a military accused have been re-
ferred to a court-martial, many factors may impact on his
pleading decision. Subtle pressure to plead guilty is often
applied in a manner which does not rise to the level of legal
coercion. The °"^fect of such pressure actually depends on the
background ^nd personality of the individual accused. Many
motivating factors have been suggested as possible reasons
for an accused to plead guilty at a criminal trial: (1) the
threatening nature of apprehension and formal charges may jar
an admission of guilt; (2) a wish to formally atone for a
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breach of law; (3) a desire to quickly begin criminal or
substance abuse rehabilitation; (4) a desire to avoid the
expense of a trial on the merits; (5) a wish to avoid the
emotional trauma of a fully litigated trial; (6) a hope that
expediency of judicial administration in a setting free from
the publicity which often attends a trial on the merits will
invite leniency in sentencing; (7) a personal desire to
reduce exposure of the accused and his family to the public
eye; (8) conditions of pretrial confinement; (9) pressure
from family, friends or attorney; (10) due to ignorance,
deception or delusion, the accused erroneously concludes that
he is legally guilty; (11) self -destructive inclinations;
(12) desire to avoid a possible finding of not guilty by
reason of insanity which could lead to indefinite psychiatric
confinement; (13) desire to expedite proceedings because of
feelings of hopelessness, power lessness , or despair when
faced with the power of the government; (14) a desire to
protect family or friends from prosecution; (15) a fear that
fuller inquiry at trial may disclose facts which would in-
crease the sentence or result in additional prosecution; (16)
potentially overwhelming nature of the government evidence;
(17) great disparity in punishment between conviction by
443
trial and conviction by plea due to pretrial agreement.
Many of these suggested factors apply whether or not an
444
accused in factually guilty of the charge(s). All of the
factors are relevant to an evaluation of the military guilty
plea inquiry as it currently exists.
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2. Impact of Guilty Plea Inquiry on the Accused's
Rights at Court-martial
It has been suggested that the primary concern of the
guilty plea inquiry process is to protect fundamental rights
445
of the accused. Evaluation of the military guilty plea
inquiry should thus address its impact on the accused's
rights at a court-martial. During the inquiry, the accused is
advised of and must understand that an accepted guilty plea
waives his rights to be tried by a court-martial, to confront
and cross-examine witnesses against him, and his right
446
against self-incrimination. In general, an accepted plea
of guilty in the military waives appellate review of all
requirements for legal guilt, including all constitutional
and procedural safeguards designed to assure a full and fair
447
judicial proceeding on the merits. Specifically, military
appellate courts have held that a guilty plea waives appel-
448
late review of: (1) minor defects in the drafted charges;
(2) non jursidict ional defects in the member composition of
449
the court during findings or the merits; (3) defective
staff judge advocate advice to the CA regarding the pretrial
450 451
investigation; (4) defective pretrial investigation;
452
(5) lack of defense counsel at pretrial investigation; (6)
i-i .effective assistance of counsel at pretrial investiga-
453 454
tion; (7) Sixth Amendment violations; (8) Fourth Amend-
455
ment violations;
On the other hand, military appellate courts have
specifically held that a valid guilty plea does not waive the
456




defects in the drafted charges; (3) status as a conscien-
458 459
tious objector; (4) denial of requested counsel; (5)
460
lack of verbatim trial record; (6) defective court compo-
461 462
sition during sentencing; (7) statute of limitations;
463
(8) admissibility of evidence on sentencing; (9) right to
464 465
a speedy trial; (10) challenge of military judge; (11)
466
trial on unsworn charges. Thus, an accepted guilty plea
waives some, but not all, areas of appellate review. It is
important to weigh the effect of an acceptable guilty plea in
terms of its actual impact on the rights of the military
accused ,
3. Impact of the Military Guilty Plea Inquiry on the
Integrity of the Military Justice System
In enacting the UCMJ , Congress intended to balance the
security and order necessary to achieve maximum military
performance against the value and integrity of the indivi-
467
dual necessary to achieve maximum justice. As with most
areas of the law, the military justice statutes, the MCM, and
military case law have been in a constant state of change to
maintain that balance. The United States Supreme Court has
recognized the special needs of the military by exempting the
military justice system from providing such rights as a grand
468
jury indictment and petit jury trial. On the other hand,
the military law which has evolved regarding the guilty plea
inquiry demonstrates the lengths to which military courts and
Congress have gone to protect the individual. An evaluation
of the military guilty plea inquiry must therefore be made
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with the integrity of the military justice system in mind.
B. Analysis of Military Guilty Pleas
1. Potential Effect of Detailed Guilty Plea Inquiry
at Court-martial
Many legal commentators have pointed out the drawbacks
of detailed guilty plea inquiries. Such inquiries in courts-
martial have become enormously complicated; the primary
detriment has been discussed in terms of cost of the addi-
469
tional burden placed on the military judiciary. Detailed
guilty plea inquiries in a criminal justice system drive
systemic costs up in three ways: (1) expense of the lengthy
court time required to conduct the inquiry; (2) expense
required for trials on the merits of accused who would have
been convicted pursuant to their guilty pleas, had the plea
not been rejected; (3) expense of the increased appellate
470
litigation resulting from detailed inquiry. The additional
time spent by a military judge with the accused during the
guilty plea inquiry translates to extra transcription costs
due to the record required by RCM 910(2). Further, additional
judges, support staff, and court space are required by the
471
lengthier guilty plea proceedings and additional trials.
Finally, the reversal of more cases because of the demanding
guilty plea inquiry in the military drives up the expense of
appellate counsel, appellate support personnel, appellate
transcripts, and can also result in additional costs due to




Conversely ,. some commentators argue that substantial
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benefits accrue from a protective guilty plea inquiry such as
that found in the military: (1) the possibility of convicting
a factually innocent accused may be reduced; (2) the accused
may be spared improper or ignorant surrender of his rights;
(3) the integrity of courts may be enhanced due to reduced
allegations of improper convictions; (4) public respect may
be increased for the quality of justice in the system; (5)
society may profit from the productivity of an accused who
would have been found guilty but for his rejected guilty
plea; (6) a legally innocent accused whose guilty plea was
rejected will have a better opportunity for employment with-
out a criminal record; (7) an accused may be less likely to




These arguments presuppose that an intensive guilty
plea inquiry will result in fewer convictions and that no
alternative means exist to preserve an accused's rights at
trial. No statistical data exists to support the assertion
that more rejected guilty pleas will necessarily result in
fewer convictions. Most of the reasons motivating a guilty
plea previously discussed are not impacted by a detailed
guilty plea inquiry, except perhaps an erroneous conclusion
474
of legal guilt. In fact, almost all of the listed reasons
for guilty pleas may provide motivation to plead guilty
475
whether or not the accused is factually guilty. This may
especially be true if the accused is faced with overwhelming-
ly convincing evidence in the hands of the government prose-
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cutor. As discussed earlier, many guilty pleas in the milita-
ry are rejected because of the mere possibility that a legal
defense exists. The accused, with the assistance of a compe-
tent defense counsel, is in a far better position than the
court to weigh potential legal defenses in comparison with
the subjective strength of the factors motivating the guilty
plea .
There are also no convincing arguments that the de-
tailed military guilty plea inquiry alone protects the ac-
cused from improper waiver of his fundamental rights at
trial. As previously discussed, a guilty plea in the military
A76
waives several potential appellate issues. Most of the
issues waived relate to the accused's pretrial investigation
477
and to issues of legal guilt. However, the impact of such
waiver is softened by the MCM requirement that such issues
478
must be raised by motion prior to entry of the plea. For
example, motions to suppress evidence based on alleged Fourth
Amendment violations must now be brought prior to the plea,
pursuant to Military Rules of Evidence, Rule 311, which was
enacted in 1980 as a departure from prior military prac-
479
tice. Litigation of such issues prior to arraignment takes
much of the potential sting from their waiver once the guilty
plea is entered because the accused and his counsel know the
court's disposition on a legal issue when pleas are entered.
If the motion is granted, then the accused has the benefit of
legal protections which may be totally dispositive of the
case. Further, as discussed earlier, under military case law




the case survive a guilty plea. Thus, the detailed review
of the accused's legal understanding of his rights during the
guilty plea colloquy may not necessarily result in increased
protection to him.
Arguments can be made that the military guilty plea
inquiry does not necessarily enhance the integrity of the
military justice system. The military law which has evolved
in this area is complicated for lawyers and military judges,
and is virtually incomprehensible to lay persons. Raising a
potential legal issue from the information provided by the
accused during a lengthy guilty plea inquiry and rejecting
his plea is legal "mumbo jumbo" to the average person. What
is touted as enhancing integrity of the military justice
system is often simply viewed as part of the dilatory game
played by the legal profession. To suggest that society may
view negatively a system that occasionally convicts a factu-
ally innocent accused who pleads guilty overlooks the fact
that mistakes are also made during trials on the merits in
criminal cases. Public confidence in the fairness of the
military justice system is not necessarily fostered by an
overzealous guilty plea inquiry, and may be enhanced by
reforms to the plea inquiry.
2. Military Court Guilty Plea Inquiries Transcend
Constitutional Requirements
The only constitutionally mandated test for acceptance
of a guilty plea is that it was entered voluntarily and
481
understandingly . The military courts will not accept a
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guilty plea unless: (1) the accused truly believes he is
guilty and acknowledges guilt of the elements of the offense;
(2) the accused does not present evidence inconsistent with
his plea; (3) the facts relevant to the plea and pretrial
482
agreement establish a factual basis for the plea. Thus,
under military law, there is no possibility that a guilty
plea will be accepted when the accused protests his innocence
483
as occurred in North Carolina v. Alford . Judge Ferguson of
COMA in United States v. Louebs discussed the paternalistic
attitude prevailing in military courts:
North Carolina v. Alford did not
establish the law of this court. Care
did, and I submit that the military rule
for the acceptance of a guilty plea, set
forth in Care
, is stricter than that
provided in Rule 11 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure. This is not the
first time we have had occasion to apply
a broader test in military cases than
that required in the federal civilian
courts .
The stricter rule in military cases is a
salutary one. Many of those in the mili-
tary are now serving by reason of compul-
sory laws; many are away from home, fami-
ly, and friends for the first time; and
many are of an age making them responsi-
ble in some jurisdictions only as juve-
niles. These and other similar reasons
make it desirable that the elicitation of
the facts reflecting that the accused is
in fact guilty of the offenses to which
he is so pleading be proved under a more
stringent rule. 484
Various legal authors have suggested that one jf the
primary concerns of a criminal justice system should be to
ensure that factually innocent defendants are not convict-
485
ed . The federal courts have recognized this concern in




guilty plea. However, the requirement that a factual basis
be established in addition to constitutional requirements has
been carried to the extreme in military courts. The military
requirement innures to the benefit of the factually or legal-
ly innocent accused whose guilty plea is rejected and who is
later found innocent on the merits of his case. However, it
is of absolutely no benefit to the accused with an arguable
legal defense or who is factually innocent and is later
nevertheless convicted on the merits of his case after his
guilty plea is rejected. The latter type of accused may
suffer sentence disparity caused by loss of the benefits of a
plea bargain or by loss of the sentencing benefit which
accrues from the attitude that a guilty plea is indicative of
remorse and is thus evidence of rehabilitative potential.
Other analyses of the role of the guilty plea focus on
the function of pleas rather than the accused's ideas regard-
AST
ing his guilt or innocence. The factual basis for a guilty
plea is not considered to be in issue. Instead, emphasis is
placed on the adequacy of the accused's waiver of his right
488
to a trial on the merits. This functional view of guilty
pleas is far more realistic than suggestions that great
efforts should be expended by trial courts to insure that a
factual basis be established through judicial '-onfession. It
is consistent with most of the reasons which motivate an
489
accused to plead guilty. Further, this emphasis is totally
consistent with an analysis of the guilty plea inquiry in
490
terms of waiver of the accused's rights. If the record of

the guilty plea inquiry is sufficient to establish that the
plea was voluntarily and understandingly entered, then it is
considered adequate. The careful efforts by military courts
to scrutinize a guilty plea for its voluntary and understand-
ing nature should be made without requiring a confessed
factual basis. This approach simultaneously fosters the inte-
grity of the military justice system because the accused will
no longer have overwhelming incentive to lie to the court
concerning factual basis to preserve the validity of his
guilty plea. As has been discussed, many factors other than
factual guilt may motivate his plea. This emphasis would also
alleviate the ethical dilemma created when an accused,
whether guilty or not, informs his counsel that, to secure
some advantage, he desires to lie to the court to assure
acceptance of his guilty plea. A shift from the protective
philosophy of the military courts allowing guilty pleas only
in cases of factual guilt to the functional pleading outlook
would require substantial changes in military law.
3. Military Courts Force an Unconstitutional Dilemma
on the Accused
For the military accused who is not willing to acknow-
ledge his guilt or believes himself to be innocent but is
faced with overwhelming government evidence, a dilemma of
possible constitutional dimensions is c.eated. Such an ac-
cused may essentially be deprived of the opportunity to seek
a pretrial agreement with the CA and the real possibility of
a less severe sentence. The accused's honesty during the
guilty plea colloquy would result in certain rejection of the
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plea because of the military requirement for its factual
accuracy. Thus, the accused must realistically choose between
deceiving the court during the guilty plea inquiry and a
potentially harsher sentence than might be awarded to a
similarly situated defendant unburdened by belief of
innocence
.
As discussed earlier in this paper, the military ac-
cused is prohibited from pleading guilty to an offense pun-
491
ishable by death or if unrepresented by a defense counsel.
In United States v. Matthews
,
COMA held that Congress had not
acted arbitrarily in banning guilty pleas to death penalty
offenses under Article 45, UCMJ and that the accused had no
492
constitutional right to enter such a plea. By implication,
the United States Supreme Court approved a similar restric-
493
tion by North Carolina in the Alf ord decision. Military
and civilian criminal courts have also remained steadfast in
their refusal to recognize a general constitutional right to
494
plead guilty. However, the Supreme Court in Alf ord did not
foreclose the possibility that it might require a court to
accept a guilty plea from an accused thrust on the horns of
the above-described dilemma. Further, the Alf ord court recog-
nized the judge's discretion to refuse guilty pleas under
Rule 11, but refused to delineate the scope of that discre-
495
tion. By implication, the Court left open the possibility
that it may give definition to the scope of judicial discre-
tion to refuse guilty pleas in an appropriate case.
Whether the dilemma thrust upon the accused who wishes

to plead guilty despite protestations of innocence violates
due process has never been directly addressed by the military
appellate courts. As previously discussed, the Army CMR has
suggested that the military judge does not have absolute
496
discretion to refuse a guilty plea. However, the issue of
whether the accused's right to due process requires military
court acceptance of a guilty plea from an accused who had
additionally secured a beneficial pretrial agreement, but
could not admit guilt requires further consideration.
Due process analysis of the military requirement for
factually accurate guilty pleas should involve a three part
evaluation: (1) the requirement is assessed to determine
whether it impairs a constitutional right; if not, the inqui-
ry need go no further; (2) if a constitutional right is
impaired, the requirement is then assessed to determine if it
furthers a legitimate government interest; if not, it is
unconstitutional; (3) even if a legitimate, substantial
government interest in the requirement can be demonstrated,
it is still unconstitutional if a less restrictive means to
497
achieve it can be demonstrated.
While plea bargaining has not explicitly been elevated
to the level of a constitutional right, it has emphatically
been recognized by the Suprem'^ Court as being advantageous to
defendants because it allocs them to avoid the maximum pun-
ishment they could have received if they exercised their
498
rights to trial. Few will argue with the proposition that
defendants who insist on trial suffer substantially more
499
severe punishment than those who plead guilty. In acknow-
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ledging the constitutional legitimacy of plea bargaining, the
Supreme Court has impliedly recognized that it does trench on
500
constitutional rights to trial. If plea bargaining is a
constitutionally recognized means for the waiver of the ac-
cused's rights to trial, then the military factual accuracy
requirement for guilty pleas prohibits the accused who main-
tains innocence from utilizing one of the alternatives recog-
nized by the Supreme Court for disposal of his case. The
Supreme Court's endorsement of plea bargaining has effective-
ly raised it to the status of a quasi-constitutional right at
trial. Such a right should inure to the benefit of all
persons accused of crime, including those who refuse to admit
their guilt. Accordingly, it is submitted that the military
factual accuracy requirement for guilty pleas does effective-
ly impair a quasi-constitutional right and arguably satisfies
the first part of the proposed due process evaluation.
Assuming that the military factual accuracy requirement
for guilty pleas impairs a constitutionally recognized right,
it may still survive scrutiny if it serves a legitimate
government interest under the second part of the due process
evaluation. The government interest in requiring a detailed
factually accurate guilty plea inquiry could be argued to be
of assistance to the military judge in determining whether
the plea meets the voluntary and understanding constitutional
requirements. However, as demonstrated by the law evolving
in the federal courts, this interest can be met by a far less
detailed inquiry which focuses on the decision to plead
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guilty rather than the true factual guilt of the accused.
Another government interest possible in requiring a factually
accurate guilty plea is to make appellate review of the mili-
tary guilty plea less complicated. Again, as demonstrated by
the federal courts, the present day requirement for a full
record of the military guilty plea colloquy should meet that
501
concern. As discussed earlier, the most frequently articu-
lated government interest is the protection of the rights of
an accused who is motivated to plead guilty through ignorance
of his legal or factual innocence. Of all potential factors
motivating an accused to plead guilty, this is the only
factor which could possibly be enhanced by a detailed factu-
ally accurate guilty plea inquiry such as that found in the
502
military. An accused who is enlightened as to his poten-
tial innocence during the guilty plea colloquy may, if given
a choice, still choose to plead guilty because motivated by
other factors such as overwhelming government evidence
against him. Further, if his guilty plea is rejected and he
is forced to defend himself on the merits, a guilty finding
may nevertheless result.
The detailed factual accuracy requirement for guilty
pleas does not necessarily enhance the integrity of the
military justice 'system. The federal system has maintained
integrity without requiring a factually accurate guilty plea
to be established from the accused's own mouth. Although Rule
11 requires that a factual basis be established for
acceptance of a guilty plea, Alf ord recognized that such a




than the accused. The military justice system has been
completely revamped since Article 45, UCMJ , was enacted in
1950 to require a factually accurate guilty plea. Military
appellate courts are no longer the only bastion of protection
for the accused's rights because all SPCM's and GCM ' s are now
504
presided over by legally trained military judges. Further,
an accused tried by SPCM or GCM may now be represented by a
civilian counsel of his own choosing and/or a legally trained
military lawyer of his own choosing or detailed to represent
505
him. The atmosphere in the military is no longer one which
should evoke the parens patriae attitude toward the accused
506
expressed by COMA ' s Judge Ferguson. With the advent of the
all-volunteer military force, no accused is subjected to
military jurisdiction against his will. Further, the military
accused would most certainly be tried as an adult in other
criminal systems for similar offenses, contrary to Judge
Ferguson's concerns that many of them would be processed in
civilian juvenile court systems, but for their active duty
507
military status. Finally, RCM 910 is in many respects
508
patterned after Rule 11. The federal court system has
evolved a workable, rational system for determining the ac-
ceptability of guilty pleas. There is no government interest
in protecting the military accused which is not shared by the
federal system, which has found a significantly different
method of meeting such interests. Thus, there is no substan-
tial government interest in requiring a factually accurate




Even if a substantial government interest in requiring
factually accurate support of military guilty pleas were con-
ceded, due process evaluation would render the requirement
unconstitutional if there exists a less restrictive means to
achieve the interest. In North Carolina v. Alford
, the Court
recognized the fact that a jurisdiction could legitimately
confer by statute or case law an accused's rights to have his
509
guilty plea accepted by a trial court. However, neither
Congress nor COMA has done so. Thus, it is prudent to explore
less restrictive alternative means to protect the military
accused's rights at trial when pleading guilty. These
alternatives could alleviate the due process dilemma created
when an accused who cannot admit guilt desires the potential
benefits of a guilty plea.
C. Alternatives Available to Protect the Accused Pleading
Guilty in the Military
1. Increased Defense Counsel Role in the Guilty Plea
Process
As discussed earlier, the Supreme Court
has repeatedly considered presence of a competent defense
counsel when determining whether a guilty plea met the Con-
510
stitutional voluntary and understanding standard. With the
abundant availability of defense counsel to the military
accused, the competent advice of an attorney should alleviate
many of the concerns which have motivated Congress and the
military appellate courts in the evolution of the guilty plea
inquiry. The rigid requirements that have been laid on the
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military judge during the guilty plea colloquy could be
relaxed in cases involving defense counsel, similar to the
511
approach taken by federal courts. Similarly, the meticu-
lous and time consuming inquiry required to establish the
voluntary and understanding nature of military guilty pleas
could be considerably shortened by a dependence on defense
512
counsel to competently advise the client. There is no
necessity for the military court to reexamine the many
aspects of pretrial agreements if the defense counsel has
513
already adequately explained them to his client.
Assuming the constitutionality of the military require-
ment for a factually accurate basis for an accused's guilty
plea, the role of the defense counsel in that area could be
expanded enormously. The military judge's exacting inquiry
into the facts of the alleged offense could be reduced to a
simple inquiry as to whether the legal and factual guilt of
the accused had been discussed in detail with his attor-
514
ney. Alternatively, if the factual basis for a military
guilty plea should no longer be required to be established
through the accused's own testimony, then factual basis could
be established through independent means such as a copy of
the pretrial investigation, as is current federal prac-
515
tice. With the extremely liberal discovery available to
the defense in military cases, a defense counsel is in an
excellent position to obtain all facts necessary to play this
516
proposed expanded role in the entry of guilty pleas. With
litigation of motions prior to entry of a plea, the defense
counsel's advice to his client concerning legal guilt could
93

still be monitored by the military trial court to some de-
517
gree. Further, the military accused would still have the




Increased reliance on the defense counsel to establish
the voluntary and understanding nature of the guilty plea in
military courts would have other advantages. Through personal
interrac t ion , a defense counsel has the confidence of his
client and a much greater capacity to insure that a guilty
plea is constitutional and that the client's rights are
protected. The integrity of the military justice system would
be enhanced because the accused would have less incentive to
deceive the court during the guilty plea colloquy to obtain
the benefits of his pretrial agreement. Further, the defense
counsel would have less incentive to "coach" his client to
help the accused avoid the many responses which could lead to
rejection of his plea.
The obvious drawback to increased reliance on the de-
fense counsel to establish the constitutionality of a plea is
that there are not adequate means to review his performance
to determine whether he has competently advised his client
regarding a guilty plea. The trial court is not privy to
private consultations between the accused and his lawyer,
plea bargaining negotiations, and other counsel activity
hidden from the public eye. Further, as previously discussed,
the courts have been reluctant to find incompetence on the
519
part of defense attorneys. Conceivably, an incompetent.
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lazy, or dishonest lawyer could do extreme disservice to his
client. However, it is submitted that the current status of
military law requiring detailed inquiry by the court into the
validity of the plea provides no better assurance of defense
counsel quality. The counsel can presently manipulate and
coach legally unsophisticated clients into submission of a
guilty plea which can survive trial court scrutiny through
false or misleading responses to the court's inquiry. A
possible solution would be to require a defense counsel to
provide the military judge with an affidavit countersigned by
the accused detailing the advice provided to the accused and
activity undertaken on behalf of the accused prior to entry
of a guilty plea. Thus, both trial and appellate courts would
have a basis for reviewing defense counsel's competence and
satisfaction of his new, greater role in assuring the consti-
tutional validity of the plea.
2. Reduced Judicial Supervision of Military
Pretrial Agreements
Because a large number of military cases involve pre-
520
trial agreements, the requirements for detailed scrutiny
thereof during the guilty plea inquiry involve significant
521
expenditures of judicial resources. When receiving guilty
pleas involving plea bargains, the military judge must en-
522
deavor to safeguard both the accused's interests and the
government's interest in efficiently disposing of cases.
In attempting to achieve that balance while requiring detail
ed policing of military pretrial agreements, COMA noted
several reasons in United States v. Green for imposing cora-
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prehensive inquiry requirements on the military judge: (1) to
enhance public confidence in the plea bargaining process; (2)
to assist appellate tribunals in exposing any secret under-
standings between the parties; (3) to clarify on the record
any ambiguities lurking within the agreement; (A) to assist
in the determination that a plea is voluntarily and under-
standingly made; (5) to insure that the terras of the agree-
ment comply with the law and adhere to basic notions of
523
fundamental fairness. However, it is doubtful that COMA
anticipated the increasingly restrictive nature of Green '
s
progeny and the attendant stress placed upon military judges
524
accepting guilty pleas to avoid appellate reversal.
An alternative to comprehensive on the record examina-
tion of each provision of a pretrial agreement by the milita-
ry judge during the guilty plea colloquy is for him to simply
examine the pretrial agreement prior to acceptance of the
plea and announce his interpretation of the sentencing provi-
sions and any ambiguous clauses included. The peculiar nature
of military plea bargaining which requires that a plea bar-
gaining offer originate with the accused and his counsel and
be reduced to final written form is particularly conducive to
525
such a modified trial court review. Should the accused or
his counsel disagree with the military judge's interpreta-
tion, the accused could be afforded an opportunity to with-
draw from the agreement and plead not guilty or to attempt to
negotiate a modification to the plea bargain which comports




create a record sufficient to accommodate meaningful appel-
late review of the pretrial agreement while avoiding
laborious inquiry into standard clauses, the meaning of which
should be apparent to any accused assisted by competent
counsel
.
The proposed reduction in military court scrutiny would
satisfy the concerns expressed by COMA in Green . There would
be no significant loss of public confidence in the military
plea bargaining process. The inherent inequality in bargain-
ing positions between the CA and the accused have been ad-
dressed by a host of regulations. For example, the MCM prohi-
526
bits the unreasonable multiplication of charges which may
induce a pretrial agreement offer from the defense and refer-
ral of charges when insufficient admissible evidence is
527
available to convict at trial. Questions regarding any sub
rosa agreements between the parties can be resolved by in-
dulging in a presumption that the written pretrial agreement
contains al
1
agreements of the parties. Such presumption
would place the accused in the position of affirmatively
bringing any unwritten agreements to the attention of the
court at the trial level or risk waiving the issue on appeal.
Thus, these matters can be placed before the court without
the detailed pro forma scrutiny currently practiced.
The military judge's inquiry into the pretrial agree-
ment need go no further than the Supreme Court's 1984 mandate
528
in Mabry v. Johnson . There, the Court refused to dwell on the
constitutional significance of the plea bargain itself, but
held that when the government breaches its promise regarding
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an executed plea agreement or the accused is misled regarding
its consequences, then the guilty plea may be challenged
529
under the due process clause. The accused's rights would
be adequately protected by the proposed reduced guilty plea
inquiry because a claim that he was misled would be addressed
by the military judge during discussion of ambiguous provi-
sions. A breached promise regarding an executed pretrial
agreement can be addressed as it is currently, at the appel-
late level.
Finally, limited plea bargain inquiry and examination
of the four corners of the pretrial agreement are sufficient
for the military judge to satisfy himself that the agreement
complies with the law and his notions of fundamental fair-
ness. Should the pretrial agreement not satisfy the military
judge in that regard, the accused can again withdraw from it
or negotiate a satisfactory modification. The proposed reduc-
tion in military court scrutiny of pretrial agreements
avoids the current wasteful and necessary practice of
sentence by sentence dissection through verbal intercourse
with the accused, while preserving the protections currently
afforded him.
D. Military Court Guilty Plea Inquiry as a
Protective Forum
The current military guilty plea inquiry is justified
as being protective of the accused's rights; the effect of
the inquiry on those rights must be evaluated against the
background of reasons that an accused may decide to plead
530
guilty. As discussed earlier, a military accused may be
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faced with a host of overriding concerns which may compel him
to enter a plea of guilty. The military accused is placed in
the unique position of testifying in favor of his own convic-
tion during the guilty plea colloquy in order to successfully
plead guilty and meet those concerns. Because of the nature
of military guilty pleas, such testimony must not only pro-
vide detailed replies to court inquiry, but must be factually
accurate for the plea to be accepted.
The detailed advice to the military accused required
during the guilty plea inquiry often provides no protection
for him, depending on his motivation to plead guilty. For
example, accurate court advice regarding the maximum sentence
possible for the offense charged affords no protection to the
531
accused benefitted by a pretrial agreement or one facing a
SPCM with a jurisdictional sentencing limitation of con-
finement for six months, much less than the potential maximum
for most military felonies. Advice regarding the elements of
an offense, even if truly comprehended by the accused, will
have no impact when the plea is motivated by considerations
other than belief in legal or factual guilt. Further, an
accused who is truly motivated to plead guilty is unlikely to
respond in any manner other than to indicate his understand-
ing of court advice.
The detailed guilty plea colloquy does not always ef-
fectively determine the voluntary and understanding nature of
the plea. In fact, judges' efforts to determine understanding




which inadvertently coerced the plea. The specific infor-
mation Care required to be elicited by military courts in
support of an understanding plea encourages contrivance on
the part of an accused motivated to convince the court to
533
accept his plea. As discussed earlier, absent some speci-
fic evidence of plea coercion, military appellate courts have
534
only infrequently found guilty pleas to be involuntary.
The plea inquiry into pretrial agreements also provides
no practical protection to the accused. The meticulous scru-
tiny of pretrial agreement provisions is not likely to evoke
an indication of non-understanding by an accused who wishes
to convince the court to accept his guilty plea. The public
policy scrutiny of pretrial agreements does not always inure
to the accused's benefit because it may result in judicial
disapproval of an agreement which is strongly supported by
the accused. This concern has been somewhat alleviated by the
recent trend of military appellate courts of finding provi-
sions not violative of public policy when a "freely conceived
535
defense product." An accused motivated to plead guilty can
overcome a public policy issue during the guilty plea collo-
quy simply by espousing a clause as being conceived by him.
The guilty plea inquiry is also not a good forum for discov-
ering hidden agreements between the parties, ^y their very
nature, such agreements provide the accus-", d with incentive to
conceal them from the court.
Finally, as previously discussed, the military require-
ment for factually accurate guilt provides no practical pro-
tections to an accused. Evaluation of the facts of a case to
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determine factual and/or legal guilt develops largely as an
alternative-weighing strategy process. The accused, assisted
by counsel, must carefully weigh the facts and the likelihood
of a successful defense on the merits against the benefits
obtainable through a guilty plea. Once the accused has deter-
mined that the benefits of pleading guilty outweigh all other
considerations, it is unlikely that he will be deterred from
pleading guilty by an in-depth guilty plea colloquy.
From the foregoing discussion^ it is apparent that the
military guilty plea inquiry motivates an accused who has
chosen to plea guilty to mislead and falsify during virtually
all phases of the hearing. The Supreme Court has held that
such misrepresentations during a federal guilty plea inquiry
do not necessarily foreclose later claims that a plea was not
knowingly and voluntarily entered, even though such inquiry
536
was intended to flush out and resolve such issues. Regard-
less of the detail in which the military judge conducts the
guilty plea colloquy, he cannot protect against a later claim
by an accused that his plea a was coerced, even if such coer-
cion was specifically disavowed at trial. Thus, not only does
the military guilty plea inquiry fail to provide intended
protection to the accused, but it also fosters deception by
him and fails to finally resolve the potential constitutional
issues in any plea. As a practical matter, the military
guilty plea does not effectively serve the interests of the
accused or the government.
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E. Necessity of Plea Bargaining in the Military
The difficulties with plea bargaining and the attendant
problems which have evolved in the law of military guilty
plea inquiries could quite simply be resolved by abolishing
guilty pleas. The Supreme Court has often reiterated its
position that an accused has no constitutional right to plead
537
guilty in a criminal trial. The military has already
abolished guilty pleas to offenses which carry a possible
538
death penalty. Thus, there is no constitutional reason why
guilty pleas could not be totally prohibited in the military.
Of course, such a move would also eliminate all pretrial
agreements. It is thus relevant to examine the necessity for
plea bargaining.
As discussed earlier, many legal scholars support the
abolition of plea bargaining, raising two separate arguments:
(1) plea bargaining coerces possibly innocent defendants into
waiver of important constitutional rights, including the
right to trial by jury; (2) it results in inappropriately
lenient sentences because prosecutors and judges make dispo-
sitional concessions to defendants based strictly on admini-
539
strative expediency. Thus, plea bargaining is attacked
from the standpoint of due process and because administra-
tively expedient sentences ca^.not be justified under a deter-
rence, societal protection, or rehabilitation rationale or
any other theory of penal sanction.
On the other hand, plea bargains are supported when
they occur in what is termed an "appropriate system". The
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results of negotiated trials in an appropriate system will so
closely approximate those at a contested trial that the
540
difference involves no inherent illegitimacy. The previ-
ously presented arguments against plea bargaining are not
applicable in an appropriate system which meets the following
basic requirements: (1) the accused must always have the
opportunity for a jury trial to resolve both the merits and
sentence in his case; (2) the defendant must be at all times
represented by competent counsel during plea bargain negotia-
tions; (3) the defense and the prosecution must both have
equal access to evidence bearing on the outcome of the case
should it go to trial; (4) all parties should have the re-
sources to take the case to trial should pretrial negotia-
541
tions fail. In such an appropriate system, the plea bar-
gaining system is perhaps no less rational than the trial
system upon which it is based.
The military justice system closely approximates the
appropriate system just described. An enlisted military ac-
cused facing trial by GCM or SPCM has the option of having
both the merits and sentence in his case decided by an impar-
tial panel of members, at least one-third of whom are also
542
enlisted. Such an accused has the right to be represented
by a civilian counsel of ^ is own choice or a military attor-
ney of his choosing, ? £ reasonably available, in addition to
543
the military defense counsel that is detailed to his case.
Such counsel must be qualified members of the bar of a state
or federal court and are subject to the professional supervi-




armed force with cognizance over the case. The defense
counsel chosen by or appointed for the accused is expected to
represent his client at all times, including during negotia-
545
tion of a pretrial agreement. Discovery rules in the
military not only require that both the prosecution and the
defense have equal access to all available evidence, but the
parties have the affirmative obligation to disclose certain
546
types of evidence to the opposing side. These liberal
rules apply both with respect to evidence offered on the
merits and during the sentencing phase of the bifurcated
547
military trial. Each party to a military trial has equal
access to witnesses, including experts to be provided at
government expense if their testimony is deemed to be rele-
548
vant and necessary.
Should pretrial agreement negotiations fail in the
military, the parties at least have equal resources to go
forward with the case at trial. The government absorbs the
expense of both the prosecution and defense (assuming the
accused employs a military attorney) at both the trial and
549
appellate levels. The numbers of prosecutors, defense
counsels, judges and support resources available in any of
the services are a function of supply and demand, as limited
by the budgeting restraints set by Congress, the Department
of Defense, and intra-service funding priorities. Thus, like
most criminal jurisdictions, the availability of resources to
try cases on the merits is somewhat subject to the prevailing
governmental budgetary climate. However, this is perhaps less
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true in the military because pretrial agreement decisions are
made by the CA, who is not in the same chain of command and
not subject to the budgeting resource considerations of the
service's legal community. Thus, if CA ' s consistently refuse
to negotiate pretrial agreements, causing a substantial in-
crease in demand for legal resources from the service's legal
community, governmental budget authorities must either pro-
vide the resources necessary to try cases or face the pros-
pect of losing cases on speedy trial and other procedural
grounds. Because of the critical emphasis placed on disci-
pline and combat readiness in the armed forces, it is un-
thinkable that budget authorities would not positively res-
pond to such a crisis.
The military justice system therefore closely approxi-
mates an appropriate system in which the two most common
arguments against plea bargaining do not apply. In addition
to being less objectionable than in other systems, plea
bargaining in the military clearly conserves judicial resour-
ces, a rationale which prompted the United States Supreme
Court to give the practice its unqualified endorsement in
550
Santobello v. New York . Therefore, it is not the military
plea bargaining process itself but the method for receiving
the resultant guilty plea which needs reform.
VI. Proposed Improvements in Guilty Plea Evaluation in the
Military Courts
A. Revisions to Article 45, UCMJ
As discussed earlier, many of the concerns which promp-





dissipated. Changes to the military justice system have
eliminated many concerns about the integrity of military
justice and the rights of accused unrepresented by qualified
counsel in many serious criminal cases.
Although some steps have already been taken in that
direction, revisions to make military guilty plea procedures
more like federal procedures are needed. Appendix E presents
a proposed revision to change Article 45, UCMJ, in three
important respects: (1) the requirement that a guilty plea be
consistent with all matters arising during the trial is
deleted; (2) the constitutional standard for acceptance of
guilty pleas is interjected; (3) the prohibition against
guilty pleas to offenses for which the death penalty can be
552
awarded is deleted. These revisions will permit modifica-
tions to MCM, 1984, deleting the current factual accuracy
requirement for guilty pleas and adopting the federal factual
basis test. The constitutional standard for acceptance of
guilty pleas has not waivered since Kercheval v. United
States was decided by the Supreme Court in 1927; the standard
set forth therein should be the statutory military standard
553
for guilty pleas. The well-intentioned prohibition against
guilty pleas in death penalty cases was designed to preclude
fac*"ually or legally innocent persons from judicially con-
victing themselves. However, it also deprives the military
accused who will surely face conviction at a trial on the
merits from the benefits of a pretrial agreement which could
insure that he receives less than the maximum sentence im-
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poseable while also saving the government the enormous
expense often attendant to trials in capital cases.
B. Revisions to RCM 910
Although RCM 910 is patterned after Rule 11, the case
law it has spawned has demonstrated that it is inadequate in
many respects. RCM 910 can be more closely aligned with Rule
11, while still providing necessary protection to a military
accused who enters a guilty plea. To correspond to Article 45
revisions proposed by Appendix E and to meet the criticisms
levelled at the military guilty plea inquiry, revisions of
RCM 910 are suggested in Appendix F. These revisions entail
several significant changes: (1) the prohibition of guilty
pleas in death sentence cases is deleted to conform with the
proposed revision to Article 45, UCM J ; (2) the court informs
the accused that it has the option of questioning him on the
record and, if that option is exercised, his answers under
oath could be used to prosecute him for perjury or false
statement; (3) the military judge has the option of estab-
lishing the factual basis for the guilty plea by questioning
the accused, eliciting independent evidence, or both; (4)
statements made by the accused anytime during the trial which
are inconsistent with the plea do not result in automatic
rejection of the plea; (5) if the military judge rejects a
guilty plea, the reasons for such rejection must be stated on
554
the record; (6) once the requirements of RCM 910 for
acceptance of a guilty plea are met, the accused acquires an
absolute right to have such a plea accepted.
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The proposed revisions to RCM 910 permit military
courts to establish the factual basis for a guilty plea by
means other than direct inquiry of the accused, in line with
the current procedure in the federal system. The requirement
for a factually accurate guilty plea to be established by the
accused is deleted, permitting constitutional equivocal pleas
in the military such as that addressed in North Caroline v.
555
Alf ord . Consistent with this important change, the milita-
ry judge would be allowed to consider statements by the
accused which are inconsistent with the guilty plea as simply
another factor to be addressed in the assessment of whether a
factual basis for the plea has been established. The proposed
revision further implements the Supreme Court's suggestion in
Alf ord that a jurisdiction may choose to confer on the
accused the right to have his guilty plea accepted by the
556
court. By requiring the military judge to set forth on the
record reasons for rejection of a guilty plea, the accused is
afforded the opportunity to have the court's decision
applying Article 45 and RCM 910 reviewed by appellate courts
for abuse of discretion.
It is noteworthy that the proposed revision to RCM 910
makes no changes to requirements for plea agreement inqui-
ries. The current provisions of MCM , 1984 do not require the
in-depth review mandated by United States v. Green and its
557
progeny. Thus, adoption of the modified plea agreement
inquiry suggested earlier would necessarily be made through





C. Proposed Revised Procedure for Military Guilty
Plea Inquiry
If implemented, the proposed changes to Article 45,
UCMJ , RCM 910, and the suggested alternative approaches to
the military guilty plea inquiry would necessitate revised
procedural guidelines for the hearing. Such revision is sug-
gested in Appendix G. The proposed changes differ in several
critical aspects from the current military practice: (1) the
court's advice to the accused includes flexibility in deter-
mining whether to establish the factual basis for the plea
through testimony of the accused or through other evidence;
(2) it provides for submission of an affidavit from the
accused and his lawyer to assist the court in determining the
voluntary and understanding nature of the plea, reflecting an
increased defense counsel role; (3) the means of court inqui-
ry into the constitutionality and factual basis of the plea
are much simpler; (4) it provides a means by which a consti-
tutional guilty plea entered by an accused unable to judi-
cially confess his guilty may be accepted by the court; (5)
it includes a truncated means for evaluation of a pretrial
agreement's impact on the acceptability of a guilty plea; (6)
it implements the accused's right to have a constitutional
plea accepted which is conveyed by the proposed revisions to
RCM 910; (7) it provides for a record of the guilty plea
inquiry which will facilitate appellate review of the milita-
ry judge's discretion in rejecting a plea; (8) it implements
the means by which a guilty plea may be accepted despite
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The proposed revisions to the procedure for military
guilty plea inquiries reduce the possibilities that a legally
unsophisticated accused may unwittingly provide responses to
the military judge which result in the rejection of his plea.
They encourage the accused to be truthful and help alleviate
the ethical dilemma facing a defense lawyer whose client
desires to fabricate in order to preserve a guilty plea. This
motivation for truthfulness will create a record which is
more accurate and facilitates meaningful appellate review of
the case. The simple and direct procedural means provided for
military court evaluation of the plea's constitutionality,
factual basis, and the pretrial agreement will involve less
court time and conserve judicial resources. The discretion of
the military judge to reject guilty pleas is reduced and a
meaningful basis for appellate review is provided. The mili-
tary judge will no longer have incentive to make an un-
reasoned rejection of a guilty plea in order to avoid appel-
late court scrutiny of the plea inquiry. Finally, the pro-
posed procedure will encourage the military accused to place
all available extenuating and mitigating evidence on the
record during sentencing without fear that it may be incon-
sistent with the guilty plea and result in a rejected plea.
Such incentive may have the consequential effect of sentences




D. Overall Impact of Proposals
An assessment of the impact of the above proposals on
the military guilty plea inquiry calls for a return to the
560
framework for analysis discussed earlier. The proposals
will virtually not affect the pleading decision of an accused
primarily motivated by any of the factors mentioned. However,
they may have enormous significance to the accused faced with
overwhelming government evidence, who, with the advice of
competent counsel, makes the reasoned decision to plead guil-
ty to alleviate the concerns suggested by those factors. Even
the accused who is primarily motivated by his erroneous
conclusion of legal guilt will be well served by the propo-
sals; the military court will be able to ferret out ignor-
ance, deception or delusion leading to the accused's
erroneous conclusion at least as well as under current mili-
tary procedure . The most significant advantage provided by
the proposals is that an accused motivated by a strong
government case against him is afforded the opportunity to
avail himself of an advantageous plea bargain. Thus, the
proposals provide increased fairness to the accused with no
attendant negative impact on his pleading decision.
The proposals will also not be detrimental to the
waiver of the rights of an accused pleading guilty at court-
martial. Under the revised guilty plea procedural rules and
guidelines, matters such as jurisdictional defects, rights to
counsel and a host of sentencing errors will still be review-
able by military appellate courts, as under the current
561
system for acceptance of guilty pleas. Additionally, the
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integrity of the military justice system would be preserved.
While the proposals for reform would result in procedural
economy, they still address the concerns expressed by Con-
gress in enacting Article 45, UCHJ and by COMA in the L u e b b
s
562
decision. The proposals merely return the emphasis in the
acceptance of military guilty pleas to the constitutional
requirements recognized by the United States Supreme Court.
That such emphasis also results in judicial economy and the
increased ability of a military accused to enjoy the benefits
of his plea bargain in a manner equal to a similarly situated
federal defendant will enhance perceptions that military
justice system affords the opportunity for a fair trial.
VII. Conclusion
Since the enactment of Article 45, UC'IJ, the military
has structured its law concerning the acceptance of guilty
pleas around the precept that governmental abuse should be
restrained. Perhaps that emphasis is an outgrowth of the
historical mistrust of guilty pleas. A more likely explana-
tion is that it reflects a concern that the military justice
system will be perceived as more responsive to its needs for
discipline than the due process mandate of the United States
Constitution. Since the enactment of the UCMJ , military law,
like most common law systems, has been in a constant state of
change. During that period, while significant Supreme Court
decisions have been handed down in the area, the basic con-





With the Supreme Court's recognition of plea bar-
gaining, the federal criminal system and the military justice
system shared many similar concerns in developing case law to
implement the constitutional standard for guilty pleas. In
Rule 11 and RCM 910, those concerns have been manifested
-:i-h many similarities. Thethrough procedural regulations witn
few areas of disagreement, along with manifestly differing
appellate interpretations of similar provisions of the rules,
have led to case law which is widely divergent when the two
systems are compared. Both systems have developed extra-
constitutional safeguards for the protection of the accused
entering a guilty plea. However, the military appellate
courts have gone far beyond the federal courts in assuring
the voluntary and understanding nature of guilty pleas.
Certainly, there are significant differences bet^veen
the military justice system and the federal system worthy of
note. The military justice system is designed to function
under a code with world-wide applicability. The leadership
position of the CA , who is responsible for negotiating pre-
trial agreements with the accused, is without parallel in the
federal system. Unless awarded a punitive discharge at court-
martial, the return of the accused to an active military unit
after his sentence is served is unique to military justice.
The military accused may have negative perceptions of pro-
cedural fairness of ttie pleading process in a system where
the prosecutor, military judge and the defense counsel are
all in the same employ. However, these differences between
113
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the military and federal justice systems solidify arguments
that the military accused should be treated equally to his
federal counterpart. The modern day emphasis on plea bargain-
ing has raised the military accused's interest in obtaining
the benefit of such a bargain to nearly constitutional dimen-
sions. The military accused whose pretrial agreement is
rejected because his plea fails to survive the scrutiny
required by extra-constitutional military protections will
often: (1) view such results as a means by which the CA can
escape his plea bargaining obligations; (2) cultivate greater
mistrust for his defense counsel and detract from further
defense efforts on his behalf; (3) develop perceptions of
unfairness which impact his prospects for rehabilitation,
making future credible service unlikely when he returns to
a military unit upon completion of sentence. Thus, the cur-
rent military law regarding acceptance of guilty pleas de-
tracts from its effectiveness in a worldwide arena.
This paper has suggested the enactment of changes to
both Article 45, UCMJ and RCM 910. Insofar as the proposals
modify the requirement for factually accurate guilty pleas.
Congressional action to revise Article 45 is necessary. Con-
gress has historically accorded much deference to military
appellate decisions and has only acted once to nullify a COMA
563
decision. Thus, the proposed revisions tj RCM 910 will
likely withstand Congressional scrutiny if approved by COMA.
This author therefore suggests that the position of COMA
regarding the acceptance of guilty pleas in the military be
reassessed to comport with constitutional mandate, the more
114

compelling features of federal law and the fundamental fair-




Rule 11, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
(a) Alternatives.
(1) In General. A defendant may plead not guilty,
guilty, or nolo contendere . If a defendant refuses to plead
or if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court
shall enter a plea of not guilty.
(2) Conditional Pleas. With appproval of the court and
the consent of the government, a defendant may enter a condi-
tional plea of guilty or nolo contendere , reserving in writ-
ing the right, on appeal from the judgment, to review of the
adverse determination of any specified pretrial motion. If
the defendant prevails on appeal, he shall be allowed to
withdraw his plea.
(b) Nolo Contendere . A defendant may plead nolo contendere
only with the consent of the court. Such a plea shall be
accepted by the court only after due consideration of the
views of the parties and the interest of the public in the
effective administration of justice.
(c) Advice to Defendant. Before accepting a plea of guilty
or nolo contendere , the court must address the defendant
personally in open court and inform him of, and determine
that he understands, the following:
(1) the nature of the charge to which the plea is
offered, the mandatory minimum penalty provided by law, if
any, and the maximum possible penalty provided by law,
including the effect of any special parole term and, when
applicable, that the court may also order the defendant to
make restitution to any victim of the offense; and
(2) if the defendant is not represented by an attor-
ney, that he has the right to be represented by an attorney
at every stage of the proceeding against him, and if
necessary, one will be appointed to represent him; and
(3) that he has the right to plead not guilty or to
persist in that plea if it has already been made, and he has
the right to be tried by a jury and at that trial has the
right to the assistance of counsel, the right to confront,
and cross-examine witnesses against him, and the right not to
be compelled to incriminate himself; and
(4) that if his plea of guilty or nolo contendere is
accepted by the court there will not be a further trial of
any kind, so that by pleading guilty or nolo contendere he




(5) if the court intends to question the defendant
under oath, on the record, and in the presence of counsel
about the offense to which he has pleaded, that his answers
may later be used against him in a prosecution for perjury or
false statement.
(d) Insuring That the Plea is Voluntary. The court shall
not accept a plea of guilty or nolo contendere without first,
by addressing the defendant personally in open court,
determining that the plea is voluntary and not the result of
force or threats or of promises apart from a plea agreement.
The court shall also inquire as to whether the defendant's
willingness to plead guilty or nolo contendere results from
prior discussions between the attorney for the government and
the defendant or his attorney.
(e) Plea Agreement Procedure.
(1) In General. The attorney for the government and
the attorney for the defendant or the defendant when acting
pro se may engage in discussions with a view toward reaching
an agreement that, upon the entering of a plea of guilty or
nolo contendere to a charged offense or to a lesser or
related offense, the attorney for the government will do any
of the following:
(A) move for dismissal of other charges; or
(B) make a recommendation, or agree not to oppose
the defendant's request, for a particular sentence, with the
understanding that such recommendation or request shall not
be binding upon the court; or
(C) agree that a specific sentence is the appro-
priate disposition of the case.
The court shall not participate in any such discus-
sions .
(2) Notice of Such Agreement. If a plea agreement has
been reached by the parties, the court shall, on the record,
require the disclosure of the agreement in open court or, on
a showing of good cause, in camera , at the time the pica is
offered. If the agreement is of the type specified j.n
subdivision (e)(1)(A) or (C), the court may accept or reject
the agreement, or may defer its decision as to the acceptance
or rejection until there has been an opportunity to consider
the presentence report. If the agreement is of the type
specified in subdivision (e)(1)(B), the court shall advise
the defendant that if the court does not accept the
recommendation or request the defendant nevertheless has no




(3) Acceptance of a Plea Agreement. If the court
accepts the plea agreement, the court shall inform the
defendant that it will embody in the judgment and sentence
the disposition provided for in the plea agreement.
(4) Rejection of a Plea Agreement. If the court
rejects the plea agreement, the court shall, on the record,
inform the parties of this fact, advise the defendant
personally in open court or, on a showing of good cause, in
camera
, that the court is not bound by the plea agreement,
afford the defendant the opportunity to then withdraw his
plea, and advise the defendant that if he persists in his
guilty plea or plea of nolo contendere the position of the
case may be less favorable to the defendant than that
contemplated by the plea agreement.
(5) Time of Plea Agreement Procedure. Except for good
cause shown, notification to the court of the existence of a
plea agreement shall be given at the arraignment or at such
other time, prior to trial, as may be fixed by the court.
(6) Inadmissibility of Pleas, Plea Discussions, and
Related Statements. Except as otherwise provided in this
paragraph, evidence of the following is not, in any civil or
criminal proceeding, admissible against the defendant who
made the plea or was a participant in the plea discussions:
(A) a plea of guilty which was later withdrawn;
(B) a plea of nolo contendere ;
(C) any statement made in the course of any
proceedings under this rule regarding either of the foregoing
pleas; or
(D) any statement made in the course of plea
discussions with any attorney for the government which does not
result in a plea of guilty or which result in a plea of
guilty later withdrawn.
However, such a statement is admissible (i) in any
proceeding wherein another statement made in the course of
the same plea or plea discussions has been introduced and the
statement ought in fairness be considered co temporaneously
with it, or (ii) in a criminal proceeding for perjury or
false statement if the statement was made by the defendant
under oath, on the record, and in the presence of counsel.
(f) Determining Accuracy of Plea. Notwithstanding the
acceptance of a plea of guilty, the court should not enter a
judgment upon such plea without making such inquiry as shall




(g) Record of Proceedings. A verbatim record of the
proceedings at which the defendant enters a plea shall be
made and, if there is a plea of guilty or nolo contendere ,
the record shall include, without limitations, the court's
advice to the defendant, the inquiry into the voluntariness
of the plea including any plea agreement, and the inquiry
into the accuracy of a guilty plea.
(h) Harmless Error. Any variance from the procedures
required by this rule which does not affect substantial





(a) If an accused after arraignment makes an irregular
pleading, or after a plea of guilty sets up matter
inconsistent with the plea, or if he fails or refuses to
plead, a plea of not guilty shall be entered in the record,
and the court shall proceed as though he had pleaded not
guilty .
(b) A plea of guilty by the accused may not be
received to any charge or specification alleging an offense
for which the death penalty may be adjudged. With respect to
any other charge or specification to which a plea of guilty
has been made by the accused and accepted by the military
judge or by a court-martial without a military judge, a
finding of guilty of the charge or specification may, if
permitted by regulations of the Secretary concerned, be
entered immediately without vote. This finding shall
constitute the finding of the court unless the plea of guilty
is withdrawn prior to announcement of the sentence, in which
event the proceedings shall continue as though the accused




MCM, 1984, RCM 910
(a) Alternatives.
(1) In general. An accused may plead not guilty or
guilty. An accused may plead, by exceptions or by exceptions
and substitutions, not guilty to an offense as charged, but
guilty to an offense included in that offense. A plea of
guilty may not be received as to an offense for which the
death penalty may be adjudged by the court-martial.
(2) Conditional pleas. With the approval of the mili-
tary judge and the consent of the Government, an accused may
enter a conditional plea of guilty, reserving in writing the
right, on further review or appeal, to review of the adverse
determination of any specified pretrial motion. If the
accused prevails on further review or appeal, the accused
shall be allowed to withdraw the plea of guilty. The Secreta-
ry concerned may prescribe who may consent for the Govern-
ment; unless otherwise prescribed by the Secretary concerned,
the trial counsel may consent on behalf of the Government.
(b) Refusal to plead; irregular plea. If an accused fails
or refuses to plead, or makes an irregular plea, the military
judge shall enter a plea of not guilty for the accused.
(c) Advice to accused. Before accepting a plea of guilty,
the military judge shall address the accused personally and
inform the accused of, and determine that the accused under-
stands, the following:
(1) The nature of the offense to which the plea is
offered, the mandatory minimum penalty, if any, provided by
law, and the maximum possible penalty provided by law;
(2) In a general or special court-martial, if the
accused is not represented by counsel, that the accused has
the right to be represented by counsel at every stage of the
proceedings ;
(3) That the accused has the right to plead not guilty
or to persist in that plea if already made, and that the
accused has the right to be tried by a court-martial, and
that at such trial the accused has the right to confront and





(4) That if the accused pleads guilty, there will not
be a trial of any kind as to those offenses to which the
accused has so pleaded, so that by pleading guilty the
accused waives the rights described in subsection (c)(3) of
thi s rule ; and
(5) That if the accused pleads guilty, the military
judge will question the accused about the offenses to which
the accused has pleaded guilty, and, if the accused answers
these questions under oath, on the record, and in the pres-
ence of counsel, the accused's answers may later be used
against the accused in a prosecution for perjury or false
statement .
(d) Ensuring that the plea is voluntary. The military judge
shall not accept a plea of guilty without first, by address-
ing the accused personally, determining that the plea is
voluntary and not the result of force or threats or of prom-
ises apart from a plea agreement under R.C.M. 705. The mili-
tary judge shall also inquire whether the accused's willing-
ness to plead guilty results from prior discussions between
the convening authority, a representative of the convening
authority, or trial counsel, and the accused or defense
counsel .
(e) Determing accuracy of plea. The military judge shall
not accept a plea of guilty without making such inquiry of
the accused as shall satisfy the military judge that there is
a factual basis for the plea. The accused shall be ques-
tioned under oath about the offenses.
(f) Plea agreement inquiry.
(1) In general. A plea agreement may not be accepted
if it does not comply with R.C.M. 705.
(2) Notice. The parties shall inform the military
judge if a plea agreement exists.
(3) Disclosure. If a plea agreement exists, the mili-
tary judge shall require disclosure of the entire agreement
before the plea is accepted, provided that in trial before
military judge alo\e the military judge ordinarily shall not
examine any sentence limitation contained in the agreement
until after the sentence of the court-martial has been
announced .






(A) That the accused understands the agreement;
(B) That the parties agree to the terms of the
agreement
.
(g) Findings. Findings based on a plea of guilty may be
entered immediately upon acceptance of the plea at an Article
39(a) session unless:
(1) Such action is not permitted by regulations of the
Secretary concerned;
(2) The plea is to a lesser included offense and the
prosecution intends to proceed to trial on the offense as
charged ; or
(3) Trial is by a special court-martial without a
military judge, in which case the president of the court-
martial may enter findings based on the pleas without a
formal vote except when subsection (g)(2) of this rule
applies .
(h) Later action.
(1) Withdrawal by the accused. If after acceptance of
the plea but before the sentence is announced the accused
requests to withdraw the plea of guilty and substitute a plea
of not guilty or a plea of guilty to a lesser included
offense, the military judge may as a matter of discretion
permit the accused to do so.
(2) Statements by accused inconsistent with plea. If
after findings but before the sentence is announced the
acccused makes a statement to the court-martial, in testimony
or otherwise, or presents evidence which is inconsistent with
a plea of guilty on which a finding is based, the military
judge shall inquire into the providence of the plea. If,
following such inquiry, it appears that the accused entered
the plea improvident ly or through lack of understanding of
its meaning and effect a plea of not guilty shall be entered
as to the affected charges and specifications.
(3) P, atrial agreement inquiry. After sentence is
announced tne military judge shall inquire into any parts of
a pretrial agreement which were not previously examined by
the military judge. If the military judge determines that the
accused does not understand the material terms of the agree-
ment, or that the parties disagree as to such terms, the
military judge shall conform, with the consent of the Govern-
ment, the agreement to the accused's understanding or permit




(i) Record of proceedings. A verbatim record of the guilty
plea proceedings shall be made in cases in which a verbatim
record is required under R.C.M. 1103. In other special
courts-martial, a summary of the explanation and replies
shall be included in the record of trial. As to summary
courts-martial, see R.C.M. 1305.
(j) Waiver. Except as provided in subsection (a)(2) of this
rule, a plea of guilty which results in a finding of guilty
waives any objection, \\/hether or not previously raised, inso-
far as the objection relates to the factual issue of guilt




MCM, 1984, RCM 705
(a) In general. Subject to such limitations as the Secreta-
ry concerned may prescribe, an accused and the convening
authority may enter into a pretrial agreement in accordance
with this rule.
(b) Nature of agreement. A pretrial agreement may include:
(1) A promise by the accused to plead guilty to, or to
enter a confessional stipulation as to one or more charges
and specifications, and to fulfill such additional terms or
conditions which may be included in the agreement and which
are not prohibited under this rule; and
(2) A promise by the convening authority to do one or
more of the folio v/ing:
(A) Refer the charges to a certain type of
court-martial ;
(B) Refer a capital offense as noncapital;
(C) Withdraw one or more charges or specifica-
tions from the court-martial;
(D) Have the trial counsel present no evidence as
to one or more specifications or portions thereof; and
(E) Take specified action on the sentence adjudg-
ed by the court-martial.
(c) Terms and conditions.
(1) Prohibited terras or conditions.
(A) Not voluntary. A term or condition in a pre-
trial agreement shall not be enforced if the accused did not
freely and voluntarily agree to it.
(B) Deprivation of certain rights. A term or
condition in a pretrial agreement shall not be enforced if it
deprives the accused of: the right to counsel; the right to
due process; the right to challenge the jurisdiction of the
court-martial; the right to a speedy trial; the right to
complete sentencing proceedings; the complete and effective




(2) Permissible terras or conditions. Subject to sub-
section (c)(1)(A) of this rule, subsection (c)(1)(B) of this
rule does not prohibit an accused from offering the following
additional conditions with an offer to plead guilty:
(A) A promise to enter into a stipulation of fact
concerning offenses to \'/hich a plea of guilty or as to which
a confessional stipulation will be entered;
( B) A promise
trial of another person;
to testify as a witness in the
(C) A promise to provide restitution;
(D) A promise to conform the accused's conduct to
certain conditions of probation before action by the conven-
ing authority as well as during any period of suspension of
the sentence, provided that the requirements of R.C.M. 1109
must be complied with before an alleged violation of such
terras may relieve the convening authority of the obligation
to fulfill the agreement; and
(E) A promise to waive procedural requirements
such as the Article 32 investigation, the right to trial by
court-martial composed of members or the right to request
trial by military judge alone, or the opportunity to obtain




(1) Offer. An offer to plead guilty or to enter a
confessional stipulation must originate with the accused and
defense counsel, if any.
(2) Negotiation. Upon the initiation of the defense,
the convening authority, the staff judge advocate, or the
trial counsel may negotiate the terms and conditions of a
pretrial agreement with the defense. All negotiations shall
be with defense counsel unless the accused is not repre-
sented .
(3) Formal submission. After negotiation, if any,
under subsection (d)(2) of this rule, if the accused elects
to propose a pretrial agreement, the defense shall submit a
written offer. All terms, conditions, and promises between
the parties shall be written. The proposed agreement shall be
signed by the accused and defense counsel,
agreement contains any specified action on
tence, such action shall be set forth on a
the other portions of the agreement.






(4) Acceptance. The convening authority may either
accept or reject an offer of the accused to enter into a
pretrial agreement. The decision is within the sole discre-
tion of the convening authority. When the convening authority
has accepted a pretrial agreement, the agreement shall be
signed by the convening authority or by a person, such as the
staff judge advocate or trial counsel, who has been author-
ized by the convening authority to sign.
(5) Withdrawal.
(A) By accused. The accused may withdraw from a
pretrial agreement at any time; however, the accused may
withdraw a plea of guilty or a confessional stipulation
entered pursuant to a pretrial agreement only as provided in
R.C.M. 910(h) or 811(d), respectively.
(B) By convening authority. The convening author-
ity may withdraw from a pretrial agreement at any time before
the accused begins performance of promises contained in the
agreement, upon the failure by the accused to fulfill any
material promise or condition in the agreement, when inquiry
by the military judge discloses a disagreement as to a mater-
ial terra in the agreement, or if findings are set aside
because a plea of guilty entered pursuant to the agreement is
held improvident on appellate review.
(e) Nondisclosure of existence of agreement. Except in a
special court-martial without a military judge, no member of
a court-martial shall be informed of the existence of a
pretrial agreement. In addition, except as provided in Mil.
R. Evid. 410, the fact that an accused offered to enter into
a pretrial agreement, and any statements made by an accused
in connection therewith, whether during negotiations or





Proposed Revised Article 45, UCIIJ
Pleas of the Accused
(a) If an accused after arraignment makes an irregular
pleading, or if it appears that he has entered a plea of
guilty involuntarily or through lack of understanding of its
meaning and effect, or if he fails or refuses to plead, a
plea of not guilty shall be entered in the record, and the
court shall proceed as though he had pleaded not guilty.
(b) With respect to any charge or specification to which a
plea of guilty has been made by the accused and accepted by
the military judge or by a court-martial without a military
judge, a finding of guilty on the charge or specification
may, if permitted by the regulations of the Secretary con-
cerned, be entered immediately without vote. This finding
shall constitute the finding of the court unless the plea of
guilty is withdrawn prior to the announcement of the senten-
ce, in which event the proceedings shall continue as though




Proposed Revised RCM 910
(a) Alternatives.
(1) In general. An accused may plead not guilty or
guilty. An accused may plead, by exceptions or by exceptions
and substitutions, not guilty to an offense as charged, but
guilty to an offense included in that offense.
(2) Conditional pleas. With the approval of the mili-
tary judge and the consent of the Government, an accused may
enter a conditional plea of guilty, reserving in writing the
right, on further review or appeal, to review of the adverse
determination of any specified pretrial motion. If the
accused prevails on further review or appeal, the accused
shall be allowed to withdraw the plea of guilty. The Secreta-
ry concerned may prescribe who may consent for the Govern-
ment; unless otherwise prescribed by the Secretary concerned,
the trial counsel may consent on behalf of the Government.
(b) Refusal to plead; irregular plea. If an accused fails
or refuses to plead, or makes an irregular plea, the military
judge shall enter a plea of not guilty for the accused.
(c) Advice to accused. Before accepting a plea of guilty,
the military judge shall address the accused personally and
inform the accused of, and determine that the accused under-
stands, the following:
(1) The nature of the offense to which the plea is
offered, the mandatory minimum penalty, if any, provided by
law, and the maximum possible penalty provided by law;
(2) In a general or special court-martial, if the
accused is not represented by counsel, that the accused has
the right to be represented by counsel at every stage of the
proceedings
;
(3) That the accused has the right to plead not guilty
or to persist in that plea if already made, and that the
accused has the right to be tried by a court-martial, and
that at such trial the accused has the right to confront and
cross-examine witnesses against the accused, and the right
against self-incrimination;
(4) That if the accused pleads guilty, there will not
be a trial of any kind as to those offenses to which the




accused waives the rights described in subsection (c)(3) of
this rule; and
(5) That if the military judge intends to question the
accused under oath, on the record, and in the presence of
counsel about the offense to which he has pleaded that his
answers may later be used against him in a prosecution for
perjury or false statement.
(d) Ensuring that the plea is voluntary. The military judge
shall not accept a plea of guilty without first, by address-
ing the accused personally, determining that the plea is
voluntary and not the result of force or threats or of prom-
ises apart from a plea agreement under R.C.M, 705. The mili-
tary judge shall also inquire whether the accused's willing-
ness to plead guilty results from prior discussions between
the convening authority, a representative of the convening
authority, or trial counsel, and the accused or defense
counsel
.
(e) Determining factual basis of the plea. The military
judge shall not accept a plea of guilty without making such
inquiry as shall satisfy the military judge that there is a
factual basis for the plea. If the military judge questions
the accused about the offense to which he has pleaded guilty,
the accused shall be so questioned under oath.
(f) Plea agreement inquiry.
(1) In general. A plea agreement may not be accepted
if it does not comply with R.C.M. 705.
(2) Notice. The parties shall inform the military
judge if a plea agreement exists.
(3) Disclosure. If a plea agreement exists, the
military judge shall require disclosure of the entire
agreement before the plea is accepted, provided that in trial
before military judge alone the military judge ordinarily
shall not examine any sentence limitation contained in the
agreement until after the sentence of the court-martial has
been announced.




(A) That the accused understands the agreement;






(g) Subject to the provisions of section (i) of this Rule,
once the military judge has determined that the accused's
guilty plea meets the requirments of sections (a)-(f) of this
Rule, a finding that the plea is accepted must be entered on
the record and the accused thereby acquires the absolute
right to require court acceptance of such plea notwithstand-
ing any claim of innocence by the accused during the course
of the trial. Should the military judge determine that the
accused's guilty plea does not meet such requirements and
rejects such plea, a detailed explanation of the reasons for
such rejection shall be set forth on the record.
(h) Findings. Findings based on a plea of guilty may be
entered immediately upon acceptance of the plea at an Article
39(a) session unless:
(1) Such action is not permitted by regulations of the
Secretary concerned;
(2) The plea is to a lesser included offense and the
prosecution intends to proceed to trial on the offense as
charged ; or
(3) Trial is by a special court-martial without a
military judge, in which case the president of the court-
martial may enter findings based on the pleas without a
formal vote except when subsection (g)(2) of this rule
applies .
(i) Later action.
(1) Withdrawal by the accused. If after acceptance of
the plea but before the sentence is announced the accused
requests to withdraw a plea of guilty and substitute a plea
of not guilty or a plea of guilty to a lesser included
offense, the military judge may as a matter of discretion
permit the accused to do so.
(2) Statements by accused inconsistent with plea. If
after findings but before the sentence is announced the
accused makes a statement to the court-martial, in testimony
or otherwise, or presents evidence inconsistent with the
factual basis on which a finding is based, the militay judge
shall reopen inquiry into the factual basis for the plea.
Following such inquiry, the military judge shall reevaluate
all testimony and evidence adduced during the trial and
reenter a finding as to whether or not a factual basis for
the plea exists. If the military judge finds that no factual
basis for the plea exists, any acceptance of the plea entered
under section (g) of this Rule shall be stricken and a plea





(3) Pretrial agreement inquiry. After sentence is
announced the military judge shall inquire to ensure that the
accused understands any parts of the pretrial agreement which
were not previously examined by the military judge and that
the parties agree to such terras. If the military judge deter-
mines the accused does not understand the material terras of
the agreeraent, or that the parties disagree as to such
terms, the military judge shall conforra, with the consent of
the Government, the agreement to the accused's understanding
or permit the accused to withdraw the plea.
(j) Record of proceedings. A verbatim record of the guilty
plea proceedings shall be made in cases in which a verbatim
record is required under R.C.M. 1103. In other special
courts-martial, a summary of the explanation and replies
shall be included in the record of trial. As to summary
courts-martial, see R.C.M. 1305.
(k) Waiver. Except as provided in subsection (a)(2) of this
rule, a plea of guilty which results in a finding of guilty
waives any objection, whether or not previously raised, inso-
far as the objection relates to the factual issue of guilty




Proposed Revised Procedure for Military Guilty Plea Inquiry
A. Court receives guilty plea.
1. Upon the accused's refusal to plead or upon entry
of irregular plea, a plea of not guilty is entered on the
accused's behalf.
2. The court determines whether the accused will be
allowed to enter a conditional plea.
B. Court advice to accused.
1. The nature of offense and the minimum and maximum
penalties for offense are explained.
2. Rights to counsel are explained.
3. Rights to trial on merits, confrontation and
cross-examination of witnesses and right against self-incrim-
ination are explained.
4. Waiver of rights is explained.
5. Possibility that accused's ans\\rers to court ques-
tions under oath can be used in later prosecution for perjury
or false statement are explained.
C. Voluntariness of plea established.
1. Defense counsel submits an affidavit detailing the
pleading advice given to the accused, counter-signed by the
accused. The affidavit should include an affirmation that the
accused is competent to plead guilty, possessing a sufficient
present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable
degree of understanding and has a rational as well as factual
understanding of the proceedings against him.
2. The court inquires whether the accused understands
the advice provided by the defense counsel.
3. The court inquires whether the accused is satis-
fied with the advice provided by his defense counsel and that
it is in his best interests.
4. The court inquires whether the accused is pleading





D. Factual basis for the plea is established.
1. The military judge describes the elements of the
offense to which the guilty plea is entered.
2. The military judge inquires whether the accused
has discussed both factual and legal guilt of the offense to
which the guilty plea is entered with his counsel.
3. The military judge may elicit independent evidence
from the Government to establish a factual basis for the
guilty plea, including a copy of the pretrial investigation
or a written stipulation of fact by the parties. If a stipu-
lation is offered, its effect should be explained to the
accused. If the independent evidence is ambiguous or reveals
that the accused has doubts about his factual or legal guilt,
the military judge may have him placed under oath to testify
in clarification of those matters.
4. The military judge may alternatively elicit in-
formation from the accused under oath to establish a factual
basis for the plea.
5. To establish a factual basis for the guilty plea,
it is not necesary for the accused to admit factual and/or
legal guilt. A factual basis may be established even when
the accused denies guilt of the offense to which a plea is
entered. The court must determine on the record that the
accused's persistence in pleading guilty despite his claim of
innocence represents a reasoned choice. If such a claim of
innocence is made by the accused during the guilty plea
inquiry, it is a circumstance to be considered by the mili-
tary judge along with all other evidence elicited in the
determination of whether a factual basis for the plea has
been established. To determine that a factual basis exists,
the military judge must be subjectively convinced that the
evidence is reasonably sufficient to obtain a conviction at a
trial on the merits.
E. Jurisdiction over the accused is established.
1. The court inquires of the accused as to his iden-
tity and whether he is the person charged with the offense to
which the guilty plea is entered.
2. The court inquires of the accused whether he was
on active duty in the U.S. Armed Forces on the date of the
offense to which the plea is entered and has remained in that
status since that date.





1. The court inquires whether a pretrial agreement
exists in the case. If such agreement exists, it is provided
to the military judge, minus its sentencing provisions and is
scrutinized by court.
2. After perusing the pretrial agreement, the milita-
ry judge announces the court's interpretation of any ambigu-
ous provisions.
3. The parties are then given an opportunity to
object to the court's interpretation of provisions or request
clarification of provisions not addressed by the court.
4. If the accused's interpretation of a provision
does not comport with that of the court, then the court, with
the concurrence of the Government, will modify the agreement
in accordance with the accused's understanding. Otherwise,
the parties may be given recess to renegotiate the agreement
or the accused may be allowed to withdraw the guilty plea.
5. The court inquires whether the accused understands
the pretrial agreement, agrees to its terms and is satisfied
with the representation and advice he has received from his
counsel regarding it.
6. The court inquires whether the pretrial agreement
offer originated with the defense and was made because
threats, force, coercion, harassmennt or misrepresentation.
G. Acceptance or rejection of plea.
The court determines whether guilty plea is acceptable
and, if so, makes a finding to that effect. If the plea is
not acceptable, the military judge shall make a detailed
explanation on the record of the reasons for rejecting the
plea. Upon acceptance of the guilty plea, findings on the
merits of the case may be made immediately.
H. Inconsistent statements of accused
If, after acceptance of the guilty plea by the military
court, the accused makes state^ ents or presents evidence
inconsistent with the factual basis established earlier, the
military judge should reop'^n the factual basis inquiry. The
military judge should then reevaluate the factual basis for
the plea and, if it no longer exists, withdraw his acceptance
of the plea.
I. Acceptability of sentencing terms of pretrial agreement




judge should obtain the sentencing provisions to the pretrial
agreement and announce the court's interpretation of any
ambiguous provisions.
2. The parties are then given an opportunity to
object to the court's interpretation of the sentencing provi-
sions or request clarification of provisions not addressed by
the court .
3. If the accused disagrees with the court's inter-
pretation of the sentencing provisions, the military judge
may, with the Government's consent, conform them to the
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